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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem and Aim of the Thesis 
The problem of this thesis is to compare and contrast 
the aesthetic theories of John Dewey and Susanne K. Langer. 
The problem includes separate examinations of the theories 
of Langer and Dewey as well as a critical comparison between 
their respective aesthetic theories. 
A precise formulation of any problem perhaps is 
impossible without some knowledge of the factors which con-
stitute it, in this instance, the aesthetic theories of Dewey 
and Langer. Without intending to predetermine what these 
respective theories are, or the nature of their relations to 
each other, it is useful to say something about them which 
will further illustrate the problems and aims of this thesis . 
Tentatively, at least, it may be pointed out that 
Dewey and Langer do not approach aesthetics from the same 
standpoint, nor with very similar aims. Dewey, for example, 
insists that one function of aesthetics is to restore the 
connections between art and other forms of experience.l He 
objects to any theory that isolates art from other human 
1. Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch & 
Company, 1934), p. 3. 
1 
activities, and states that his problem in aesthetics is 
"that of recovering the continuity of esthetic experience 
with the nonnal processes of living.nl Insofar as Dewey 
2 
sets out to establish the unity of art and life, his approach 
may be termed contextualist. 
Mrs . Langer, on the other hand, is not in sympathy 
with interpretations of art in terms of "experience.n2 She 
is more interested in understanding art as such, and does 
not object, as Dewey does, to distinctions which often seem 
to isolate art from life. Langer's chief work in aesthetics, 
Feeling and Form, is an approach to art from the "studio 
standpoint," or with the basic question of the nature of 
artistic creation.3 
Although Langer's approach, as well as her general 
theory, may not properly be called isolationist (where iso-
l ationist refers to any theory asser ting the separateness 
of art and life), her .position may nevertheless be character-
ized as more isolationist than Dewey's approach. This con-
tention need not be either confirmed or rejected here, but 
it may serve to sharpen and focus the problem in this ·thests . 
Despite the seemingly broad divergence in the approaches 
and aims of Dewey and Langer, a comparison of their aesthetics 
1. Ibid., p. 10. 
2. Feeling and Form (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1953), pp. 35-36. 
3 . Ibid., p. 10. 
3 
can be fruitful by pointing out and discussing the salient 
issues in their theories and the relations between them. 
The problem of this thesis is to formulate that discussion. 
2. l\tlethod 
Insofar as Langer and Dewey do not develop their 
aesthetics through the application of the same concepts to 
the same problems, this thesis cannot easily employ a pro-
cedure of parallel development and exposition of their the-
cries. For this reason, the analysis here does not proceed 
by categorizing the thought of Dewey and Langer under the 
same topics.l 
Parallel development is employed, however, whenever 
possible, and is in some degree facilitated by the omission 
of certain aspects of the theories of Langer and Dewey which 
would be of no comparative significance fo~ this study. The 
two expositional chapters of this thesis, which deal sepa-
rately with Langer and Dewey, are thus neither parallel nor 
strictly independent treatments of their subjects, but are 
rather a mixture of the two methods of approach. 
Following this first introductory chapter, the second 
chapter of the thesis deals with the aesthetics of Susanne 
Langer. Since most of Langer 's aesthetics has its roots in 
1. It would probably be a distortion, for example, to 
treat both authors~• views of art appreciation under the gen-
eral rubric of "experience." Whereas the term is central to 
Dewey's view, it does not share this status in Langer's inter-
pretation--at least not in Dewey's sense of "experience." 
a distinctive theory of symbolism which she developed in 
Philosophy in a New Key, the first part of this chapter is 
devoted to an exposition of what Langer means by symbol. 
This first part includes sections on sign and symbol func-
tion, the genesis of symbolism, and the distinction between 
discursive and presentational symbols. 
This is followed by an examination of artistic crea-
tion and the art symbol. Here, Langer's view of the charac-
teristics of artistic creation and the art object are traced 
in terms of her concepts of semblance, expressive form, sig-
nificant form, and organic form. 
4 
The next section treats Langer's interpretation of 
what is sometimes called the aesthetic nresponse," or 
"experience," but which in reference to her theory is perhaps 
best termed aesthetic conception. At this point, the impor-
tance of conception and intuition are analyzed. Langer's 
reasoning in regard to the problem of artistic truth is then 
described. The chapter closes with a section on the relation 
of art to society, and a brief summary of the main points in 
the chapter. 
Chapter three is an exposition of Dewey's aesthetics. 
Since the idea of experience is so fund~~ental in Dewey's 
theory, this chapter begins with a treatment of his view of 
aesthetic experience. The relation between form, or the 
aesthetic elements in experience, and normal, everyday ex-
perience is pointed out. This is followed by inquiries into 
what Dewey means by ~ experience, by the integration of 
"undergoing" and "doing," and by "emotionn in art. Next, 
Dewey's conception of the nature of artistic production and 
the art object is analyzed, with special attention given to 
what he means by artistic expression, creation, perception, 
and form. The significance of art for social development 
is then investigated, and chapter three ends with a summary 
of its salient features. 
5 
Chapter four, the final chapter of this thesis, com-
prises a critical comparison and evaluation of the aesthetics 
of Langer and Dewey. This final chapter aims to point out 
some of the areas of agreement and disagreement between the 
two. Finally, the conclusion of the thesis suggests some of 
the criticisms that may be made of Langer and Dewey, and also 
aims to point up some of the problems in each of their theo-
ries. 
3. Limitations 
Since the aim and scope of this thesis is that of a 
joint treatment of two philosophers, the thesis is limited 
in that it does not attempt a comprehensive presentation of 
the aesthetics of either Langer or Dewey. It is for this 
reason that each philosopher is considered primarily only 
from those perspectives on which he may be related and com-
pared to the other. 
A second limitation of this thesis is that it does not 
seek to relate Langer's or Dewey's aesthetics to any philosoph-
ical presuppositions or problems. The theories of Dewey and 
Langer may be analyzed with the aim of explaining their im-
plicit epistemological and/or metaphysical foundations. How-
ever, it is not within the scope of this thesis specifically 
to uncover any of these foundations, excepting, of course, 
when they are explicit in the subject matter at hand. As much 
as possible, then, the thesis treats the subject matter, aes-
thetics, as aesthetics, and not from the standpoint that it is 
or is not consistent with any specific philosophy. 
Related to the latter reservation, the third limitation 
of this thesis is that it does not attempt to establish whether 
or not either Dewey's or Langer's aesthetics is consistent 
with other areas of his (or her) philosophy. Most of Langer's 
work is concerned \"lith aesthetics in one way or another. This 
limit at ion accordingly does not apply so much to her theory 
as to Dewey's. Thus, at least in regard to Dewey, there is 
no contention here to the effect that his interpretation of 
art is or is not coherent with his over-all philosophical 
position, i.e., instrumentalism.l 
1. Stephen C. Pepper offers a negative answer to this 
question. His argument holds that Dewey's aesthetics is an 
organicism, and that it by no means incorporates the usual 
features of instrumentalism. Cf. his criticism in, Paul A. 
Schilpp, The PhilosophT of John Dewey (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1939 , pp. 371-72. Hereafter this volume 
is referred to as "Schilpp." 
6 
Finally, this thesis does not purport to arbitrate 
the differences between the aesthetics of Dewey and Langer, 
but rather to clarify what the salient differences are, as 
well as the major points of agreement. The conclusions are 
designed more to point out certain important problems in the 
position of each philosopher, rather than to evaluate them by 
any specific criteria of adequacy or inadequacy. 
4. Definitions 
The language used in this thesis does not generally 
deviate from the ordinary discursive use of language. The 
particular terminology used by either Langer or Dewey is de-
fined \'lithin the text. HovTever, certain terms that are con-
t inually used in the exposition may be defined here for the 
sake of clarity. 
The term "aesthetics" refers to the branch of philo-
sophy dealing with the nature and characteristics of aesthetic 
experience and artistic creation, and the work o~ art which 
is their object. The foregoing statement is not intended to 
be an original, exhaustive, or special interpretation of the 
meaning of the term "aesthetics." It is mentioned here in 
order to indicate the very general sense in which the term is 
e~ployed in the exposition. The distinctive meanings which 
Dewey and Langer attach to the term become evident in the 
text of the thesis. 
7 
The term "art'' is used to refer to the fine arts, 
including their production, appreciation, and the objects 
produced, e.g., the poem, musical piece, or painting. This 
is not, of course, a comprehensive definition of "art," in-
asmuch as entire books are written on what art is. But it 
is a way of circumscribing the reference the term has in the 
thesis when it is used only to refer to the fine arts as an 
area of human activity. The aesthetic theories of Dewey and 
Langer set forth particular meanings as to the nature of art 
objects, their production and appreciation. Hence the thesis 
is in part an elaboration of their respective definitions of 
art. The context in which the term "art" is used indicates 
whether it is used in the general sense given above, or in 
connection with Langer's or Dewey's qualified use of it. 
To avoid confusion, the terms "artistic" and "aesthe-
tic" are us~d, respectively, to refer to the artist's activity 
in creating works of art, and to the appreciative side of 
vievling works of art. The "artistic object" refers to the 
work of art seen from the artist's viewpoint. "Aesthetic 
object" refers to the work of art seen from the perspective 
of its appreciation by someone. Hm"lever, since the "ar:bi..Scttc i . 
object" is always the "ae·~;tn__eti.c;: object" as vvell, the term 
"art object" is sometimes used to mean the work of art from 
both the aesthetic and artistic perspectives. The use of 
these terms should be clear from the contexts in which they 
are used. 
CHAPTER II 
SUSANNE K. LANGER 'S AESTHETIC THEORY 
The aim of this chapter is to set forth the aest heti c 
theo r y of Langer, giving particular attention to her theory 
of symbolism, artistic creation, and the appreciation of art . 
Before examining her aesthetics, however, some bri ef remarks 
may be made about Langer and her conception of philosophy . 
1. Biographical Sketchl 
Susanne K. Langer was born of German parents in 1895. 
She graduated from a French school in Manhattan and then 
went to Radcliffe College for her M.A. and Ph.D. degrees. 
Langer r eturned to Radcliffe to teach for fifteen years as 
a tutor in the Philosophy Department. 
A. N. Whitehead exerted a strong influence on Langer, 
and it was under his ' influence that she took up the study of 
symbolic logic. In 1937 she published an Introduction to 
Symbolic Logic. Her first work was The Practice of Philosophy 
(1930), in which she presented her conception of philosophy. 
Many of the basic ideas in this book were later used in 
Philosophy in a New Key (1942), in which she developed a 
1. The very short biographical information in the 
first paragraph of this section is from, Twentieth Century 
Authors, ed. Stanley J. Kunitz (New York: The H. W. Wilson 
Company, 1955), p. 478. 
9 
10 
theory of music that was to serve as the basis for her gen-
eral theory of art. This general theory is found in Langer's 
chief work in aesthetics, Feeling and Form, A Theory of Art 
(1953). It is in this work that the theory of music · from 
Philosophy in a New Key is systematically expanded to a 
broader application to all the fine arts. Langer's most 
recent book, Problems of Art (1957), is a series of informal 
lectures which she delivered before various groups at dif-
ferent times and places. This book comprises an informal 
treatment of many of the ideas in Feeling and Form. 
2. Conception of Philosophy 
For the reason that Langer approaches aesthetics from 
a conception of philosophy in general, it is well to consider 
first her conception of philosophy. In The Practice of Philos-
.2..Ehz., Langer complains that, aside from the analytic "critique 
of science," other philosophical positions are without spe-
cific methodological principles. She says that most defini-
tions of philosophy, for example the synoptic view of philos-
ophy, state the final aims of philosophy but fail to elaborate 
any method for the achievement of those aims.l The synoptic 
viev; of philosophy is rejected insofar at least as it fails 
to provide a method. On the other hand, Langer feels that 
1. Susanne K. Langer, The Practice of Philosophy (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1930), pp. 15-16. Unless 
otherwise noted, all further references in this chapter will 
be to w·orks by Langer. 
the analytic philosophy is mistaken in considering philosophy 
to be an instrument for the generalization of the findings 
ll 
of the sciences. She goes on to suggest that what philosophy 
in fact needs is an entirely new conceptual framework, or ori-
entation. The new orientation suggested by Langer is what she 
terms the "pursuit of meaning. nl 
Langer explains what she means by the "pursuit of 
meaning" by contrasting it with another pursuit, that of 
"facts." Many sciences, as soon as they are productive of 
clear and tangible knowledge, or "facts,'' are no longer in-
cluded within the realm of philosophy. Sociology, psychology, 
even physics, might serve to illustrate this point. Yet, 
peculiarly, while these sciences have gone their independent 
ways, logic and mathematics, iri virtue of their method and 
purpose, remain in the sphere of philosophy.2 It is the busi-
ness of logic and mathematics, as such, to seek out meanings, 
not facts; they are rational, not empirical sciences.3 Langer 
finds the basis for her definition of philosophy in the nature 
and purpose of logic and mathematics, which both employ a 
method of logical implication from basic terms. 
The study of metaphysics, for example, is an attempt 
to make clear all that a concept, such as "time," means, and 
finally to define the meanings of terms like "Reality," and 
1. Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
2. Ibid., p. 31. 
3. Ibid. 
nTruth.nl The method of metaphysics, then, like logic and 
mathematics, entails the development of logical implications. 
The basic concepts which serve as starting points for further 
logical development are, says Langer, the natural unconscious 
deliverences of experience.2 
Extended to philosophy as such, Langer's conception 
of method issues in a definition of philosophy as the sys-
tematic study of meanings, comprising all the rational sci-
ences, and gpverned by the principle of seeking implications, 
or logical connections, from the basic notions derived from 
experience.3 This definition of philosophy is significant 
12 
for Langer's aesthetics particularly in that any philosophical 
inquiry, including aesthetics, will be circumscribed in its 
scope largely by whatever "basic notionsn it happens to begin 
with. This is what leads Langer to write: 
The formulation of experience ••• contained within 
the intellectual horizon of an age and a society is 
determined ••• not so much by events and desires, 
as by the basic concepts at people's disposal for 
analyzing and describing their adventures to their 
own understanding.4 
It is for this reason that the real significance of 
a philosophical system rests in its basic concepts, or impli-
cit presuppositions, from which the system is developed. 
1. Ibid., p. 35. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
4. Philosophy in a New Key (New York: The New Ameri-
can Library of World Literature, Inc., 1942), p. 3. 
The real interest of a philosophical system is not 
centered in its actual assertions, in the beliefs 
of its author; its importance lies rather in the 
logical language, the conceptual framework, the 
terms, in which these beliefs are asserted.l 
Here, the important question is: In \.Yhat nterms," with 
what nconceptual framework, n does Langer approach aesthetic 
theory? The answer to this question, put very generally, 
is that she develops her theory of art in the terms of an 
I 
idea which she considers to be new and fecund, viz., the 
transformational, or symbol-making, nature of human under-
standing.2 Symbolization is the nbasic concept,n or the 
"conceptual framework,n with which Langer analyzes and de-
scribes the nature of art.3 
13 
At the outset, then, the dominant theme in Langer's 
theory is built around the idea of symbolization. Because 
it is the office of philosophy to "unravel and organize con-
cepts, to give definite and satisfactory meanings to the 
terms we use in talking about any subject, n4 one of her aims 
in aesthetics is the clarification of meanings. She is 
particularly concerned with making clear the meaning of the 
l. The Practice of Philosophy, pp. 170-71. 
2. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 19. 
3. Ibid. Langer not only believes that this idea 
is a basis for the illumination of art theory, but also for 
all humanistic studies. 
4. Feeling and Form (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1953), p. vii. 
terms: expression, creation, symbol, import, intuition, 
and organic form.l However, the idea of symbolical trans-
formation contains the bases from which these meanings are 
to be clarified. 
Langer defines art as "the creation of forms sym- · 
bolic of human feeling.n2 Further, a symbol is defined as 
"any device whereby we are enabled to make an abstraction.n3 
Before any examination of the meanings of the terms men-
tioned above, attention is given first to what is meant by 
"symboln in Langer's definition. 
3. Symbolical Transformation 
The idea of symbolical transformation of experience 
recommends itself to Langer not only because of its own 
merits, .but also because of . the sterility of another basic 
notion in current vogue, viz., the emphasis on science and 
"scient ism. n This emphasis, or positivistic tenet, is that 
only knowledge from sense experience is true, and that, in-
deed, truth and empirical fact, or "data," are identical. 
Langer objects to this notion on the ground that so-called 
"data" are not in fact directly observed. Even in the most 
1. Ibid., p. viii. 
2. illsi·, p. 47. 
3. Ibid., p. xi. 
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empirical discipline, physical science, investigat:O:»·s ·:are ... 
more concerned with interpretations and readings of the 
data than ~dth the data per se. 
What is directly observable is only a sign of the 
"physical fact"; it requires interpretation to yield 
scientific propositions. Not simply seeing is be-
lievingi but seeing and calculating, seeing and trans-
lating. 
Thus, observation is for the most part indirect, and the 
"sense-data" on which scientific propositions are founded 
are, at least, one step removed from direct experience.2 
What the modern investigator "observes," e.g., "photo-
graphic spots and blurs," ''inky curved lines, n Ttfluctua-
tions of a tiny arrow," or Tfthe trailing path of a stylus,n 
is ''empirical enough"; 3 but it is not the actual objects 
under investigation, i.e., the "phenomena ffihich7 stand be-
hind them as their supposed causes."4 The direct observa-
tion of the "fluctuations of a tiny arrow" yields nothing 
in itself, unless it is taken as a sign of something else, 
and, moreover, unless the sign is interpreted so as to mean 
something else.5 
1. Philosophy in a Nevl Key, p. 16. 
2. Ibid., p. 15. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
-
5. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
15 
Thus, for example, we do not actually observe ether-
waves or a course of celestial events, but we do observe 
signs of these events as they are "recorded" on scientific 
instruments. On the basis of these signs it is possible to 
"read," to calculate, and to translate until the sign issues 
in a meaning significant for the problem under investiga-
tion.l This is what Langer is pointing o.ut when she says 
that, "not simply seeing is believing, but seeing and cal-
culating, seeing and translating." 
16 
A thoroughgoing positivism, theref.ore, seems to over-
look the fact that sense-data per se do not comprise the whole 
of a scientist's material.2 Langer maintains, on the con-
trary, that contemporary physical science is more concerned 
with signs and their meanings than with direct inspection of 
sense-data. Furthermore, positivism itself assumes that a 
causal relation operates between the sign of an event and 
the event itself, .although this assumption is not directly 
derived from sense-data. ''If we did not attribute an elab-
orate, purely reasoned, and hypothetical history of causes 
to the ·little shivers and wiggles of 'our apparatus, we really 
could not record them as momentous results of experiment.n3 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 16. 
3. ~· 
Langer's rejection of positivism is, then, for 
essentially two reasons: 'First, the dictum that truth and 
empirical fact are identical is confuted by the interpre-
tative nature of observation in physical science, and, 
second, positivism assumes more than is given in the direct 
observation of sense-data, i.e., causal relations as well 
as the process of interpretation of signs, which without 
interpretation have no meaning. Even in physical science, 
then, "the problem of observation is all but eclipsed by 
the problem of meaning," and any rigorous positivism "is 
jeopardized by the surprising truth that our sense-data 
are primarily ,symbols."l 
Positivism is not only untenable as an interpreta-
tion of science, but also as a method in the humanities. 
The application of "scientific methodsn to the humanities 
has not resulted in any significant advances in the humani-
ties. In psychology, for example, the application of these 
methods has served to further obscure the nature of "mental 
phenomena, n2 as 11 psychology tends to run into physiology, 
histology, and genetics.n3 
One attempt after another has failed to apply the 
concept of causality to logic and aesthetics, or 
l. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 19. 
3. Ibid., p. 18. 
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even sociology and psychology. • •• No true sci-
ence has resulted. No prospects of really great 
achievement have opened before us in the labora-
tory.l 
Langer concludes that the great generative idea, i.e., 
faith in the indubitable and visible facts of sense· experi-
ence as the only basis for knowledge and cognition, which 
gave rise to the physical sciences,2 "does not contain any 
vivifying concept for the humanistic sciences."3 
With this rejection of positivism, Langer turns to 
symbolization as her theme for explaining art. The examin-
ation of this notion includes three topics: sign and symbol 
function, the genesis of symbolism, and the distinction be-
tween discursive and presentational symbols. 
i. Sign and Symbol Function 
For Langer, signs and symbols have functions in vir-
tue of which they may be said to have meanings. For this 
reason, it is best first to find out what she means by 
"meaning."4 The first thing to be noted is that meaning is 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
3. Ibid., p. 18. 
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4. The definition that follows is of "meaning" in its 
logical or "objective" sense, i.e., , .. ,rhen a term or symbol 
means an object to a person. This sense of "meaning" is not 
to be confused with psychological meaning, e.g., when " I " 
mean some object by a symbol. Cf., Philosophy in a New Key, 
p. 45. 
not a quality of a term but a function of it. 1 A function 
is a structure seen from the standpoint of the particular 
term which is central to it. Such a structure is evident 
when the particular given term is comprehended in its total 
context, or in relation to all the other terms around it.2 
A function is a pattern viewed with reference to 
one special term round which it centers; this 
pattern emerges when we look at the given term 
in its total relation to the other terms about 
it. 
The total context in which a term occurs may be very com-
plex, involving many terms, or very simple, involving as 
fe~l as two things other than the term that nmeans. '' How-
ever , there is no complete meaning without at least two 
other things: the subject who employs the term and the 
object that is meant by it.4 
The two functions of terms which exhibit meaning are 
sign function and symbol function. In sign function there 
ar e three terms: subject, sign, and object. A sign, for 
example, "wet grounds,n is distinguished from what it sig-
nifies (its object), say, that "it has rained recently," 
by the fact that it is more readily available than its 
1. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 44. Langer uses the 
terrn function in its logical sense, i.e., to denote a rela-
tion. 
2. Ibid. 
3. ~· 
4. Ibid. 
19 
object.l The logical relation of a sign and its object is 
that of a pair, or a simple one to one correlation. The 
subject, or interpretant, however, because he finds one term 
of the pair more available, or "interesting, tt interprets it 
to signify the other term of the pair. It is only, then, 
where one term of the pair is difficult or impossible to 
apprehend that signification can apply to the other term 
more easily apprehended.2 Thus, in the example mentioned, 
nwet grounds 11 signifies, or means, that "it has rained re-
cently"; the rain itself is not available for apprehension 
and therefore is not interchangeable with "wet grounds.n 
The most important aspect of sign function, however, 
is that a sign is always a symptom of an actual ~tate of 
affairs, past, present, or future.3 This is true whether 
the sign be a natural sign, as in the example with . "wet 
grounds," or whether the sign is artificial, for example, 
the typewriter bell signifying the end ·of this line.4 In 
both instances the logical relation is the same, a one to 
one correspondence of sign and object, and in both cases a 
sign is symptomatic of an actual state of affairs. 
What ·a sign "means" . is its signification, or the 
object it points to and symptomizes. Signification is the 
1. Ibid., p. 46. 2. Ibid., p. 47. 
3. ill£., p. 46. 4. I!?ii·, pp. 46-47. 
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most elementary form of knowledge) and of error (when a 
sign is misinterpreted, and a mistake is the result}, and 
is the kind of knm'lledge humans share with animals. This 
basic form of intellection is the first example of how a 
t erm can be said to have "meaning .nl 
The symbolical function of terms, distinguished from 
their use as signals, occurs when signs are not used as symp-
toms of things but to create an attitude toward things.2 
The signal use of a term usually causes an action in accord 
with the presence of its object. For example, a knock at 
t he door signifies that someone is about to enter, where-
upon someone inside deports himself accordingly. But the 
symbolical use of a term does not cause action appropriate 
to the presence of its object. Instead, a symbol serves to 
~ ­
cr eate an idea of its object; it provokes us to think ·about 
things. 
Symbols are not proxy for their objects, but are 
vehicles for the conception of objects~ To con-
ceive a thing or a situation is not the Sru~e thing 
as to "react toward it" overtly, or to be aware of 
its presence. In talking about things we have con-
ceptions of them, not the things themselves; and it 
is the conceptions, not the things, that symbols ---
directly "mean . " Behavior toward conceptions is 
what words normally evoke; this is the typical pro-
cess of thinking.3 
1. Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
2. Ibid. , p. 24. 
3. Ibid. , p. 49. 
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Since a symbol does not stand for its object, but 
for a conception of it , the logic of symbols differs from 
that of signs. Sign function'requires three terms, but 
symbol function requires at least , four terms: symbol, sub-
ject, conception, and the object. For this reason, the two 
types of function have logically distinct structures and 
manifest different ways in which a term may be said to 
TTmean" anything.l The relation that a symbol bears to its 
conception is called connotation, and connotation is the 
second example of how a term has meaning. 
Connotation is the fundamental act of thought, and 
the characteristic of human mentality which distinguishes 
man from animals. That symbols can convey conceptions , 
whereby we are brought to think about things instead of re-
acting towards them, is explained in Langer's theory of the 
origins of symbolical transformation. 
ii. The Genesis of Symbolism 
Langer's discussion of the origins of symbolical 
transformation may be approached from two perspectives. 
First, from the semantic theory which she develops to ac-
count for the expressive use of language, and, second, from 
her reinterpretation of basic human needs and mentality. 
Her semantic theory is the next subject of this study. 
1. Ibid., p. 52. 
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Langer's basic contention is that language did not 
begin in virtue of any language instinct, nor because of 
its signal and utilitarian value in communication, but 
primarily because of man's inclination to symbolize real-
ity.l She points out that theories holding that language 
is instinctive fail to account for the fact that none of 
the feral children who have been found have been able to 
speak in any language.2 In addition, none of man's clos-
est animal relatives exhibit any ability to articulate 
speech.3 
Further evidence confuting the utilitarian view of 
language is found in the failure to teach feral children 
or apes to talk, even after creating in them a pragmatic 
demand for an object.4 The outconie of discrediting both 
the instinct and utilitarian views of language is to look 
1. Langer credits this idea to Edward Sapir; she 
quotes him as follov-rs: "The primary function of language 
is generally said to be communication •••• The autistic 
speech of children seems to show that the purely communica-
tive aspect of language has been exaggerated. It is best 
to admit that language is primarily a vocal actualization 
of the tendency to see reality symbolically, that it is 
precisely this quality which renders it a fit instrument 
for communication, and that it is in the actual give and 
take of social intercourse that it has been complicated and 
refined into the form in which it is known today." Cf., 
Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 88- 89. 
2. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 87. 
3. Ibid., p. 86. 
4. Ibid., p. 96. 
-
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somewhere else for a more adequate interpretation of 
language . 
The place to look, if Langer's hypothesis is cor-
rect, is in the areas where symbolic activity first occurred. 
Langer feels that the earliest symbolic -behavior would show 
evidence of rudimentary aesthetic reaction. The beginnings 
of language would not be instrumental behavior for adjust-
ment, but would rather be found in primitive aesthetic re-
actions,l which would of course be below the level of 
rational '\•lOrd-formation. Such reactions are evidenced in 
the early years of childhood when children show a lalling-
impulse and take enjoyment in continual vocalization. At 
this stage children use words to bring objects "into their 
minds, not into their hands. n2 If speech is not developed 
at this point, when the tendency to babble is strong, it may 
be very difficult, or impossible to develop at a later age.3 
The period during which the lalling instinct is 
strongest is characterized as, 
an optimum period of learning, ••• a stage of 
mental development in which several impulses and 
interests happen to coincide: the lalling instinct, 
the imitative impulse, a natural interest in dis-
tinctive sounds, and a great sensitivity to "ex-
pressiveness" of any sort.4 
l. Ibid. 
3. Ibid ., pp. 98-99. 
2. Ibid., p. 98. 
4. ~., p. 99. 
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It is during this period of high "sensitivity" or impres-
sionability that a child has a tendency to see a vague 
meaning in sheer visual and auditory forms. Indeed, Langer 
characterizes childhood as "the great period of synaes-
thesia.nl It is in childhood at this "optimum period of 
learning" that language is grasped and learned through rudi-
mentary symbolic and aesthetic behavior and activity. 
Langer's conclusion is that,' "the transformation of experi-
ence into concepts, not the elaboration of signals and 
symptoms, is the motive of language. Speech is through and 
through .symbolic; and only sometimes signific.rr2 
Langer's account of human needs and her concomitant 
view of mind is also at sharp variance \'lith any pragmatic 
or utilitarian view of the sarne.3 The problem Langer finds 
with these -theories is that they fail to account for human 
activities \'Thich in fact appear ineffectual in successful 
biological adjustment, or orientation, to an environment. 
I 
The first of these activities are magical and ritual 
practices, which hardly ever aid in the achievement of a 
.1. Ibid., p. 100. Langer uses this term in its 
ordinary sense, i.e., to refer to sensations occurring in-
directly by the stimulation of other sensations, as, e.g., 
when sounds may ttbe" of a certain color. 
2. Ibid., 103. 
3. The utilitarian view Langer is objecting to is, 
briefly, that all human needs stem from the drive for ad-
justment, and that the mind is primarily an instrument for 
the fulfillment of these needs. 
f avorable adjustment to environment. Yet magic and rite 
are, and always have been, extant in hwnan societies.l 
Another area of experience that the utilitarian view of 
mind does ' not easily account for is art. The attitudes of 
civilizations to art have usually been very serious, not 
to mention the fact that artists themselves will often 
sacrifice ordinary comfort fo~ the pursuit of their work . 
For this reason art could hardly be called a means of 
practical adjustment. Thirdly, the activity of dreaming--
and dreams are now generally thought to contain symbolic 
materials--is difficult to view as a practical aid in lif e 
adjustment.2 
The mind, it appears, is doing at least something 
more than adjusting the organism to an environment all of 
the time. It is for this reason that Langer proposes a 
new view of human needs. 
This alternative view, \vhile still considering the 
mind as an organ serving primary needs, seeks to discover 
needs that are distinctly human. In short, this view be-
gins with the premiss that a human mind is trying to do 
something other than an animal's mind. An animal's mind 
1. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 29 . 
2. Ibid. , pp. 29-30. Because art is taken seriously, 
and artists themselves often sacrifice creature comforts, 
Langer believes that the vievr of art· as play, which genetic 
psyc hology usually accepts, is discredited. Concerning 
dreams, she asks: "Why should the mind produce syrtlbols that 
do not direct the dreamer's activities'?" Ibid., p. 30 . 
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is realistic, pragmatic, incapable of functioning symbol-
ically.l But how account for the unpractical and unbio-
logical activities of human beings? 
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Langer accounts for these activities (ritual, magical 
practices, art, and dreams) by postulating what she terms 
man's unique basic need: the need of symbolization.2 As 
has already been pointed out, symbolization is not always 
sign behavior, or practical signals of actual conditions, 
but may often be a transformation of the materials of ex-
perience into terms which serve as vehicles of conception. 
Thus, the unique need of man is this need to symbolize his 
experience, and the activity of symbolization is what dis-
tinguishes man from the animals. 
The fact that the human brain is constantly 
carrying on a process of symbolic transformation 
of the experiential data that come to it causes 
it to be a veritable fountain of more or less 
spontaneous ideas. As all registered experience 
tends to terminate in action, it is only natural 
that a typically human function should require a 
1. Cf. Ibid., pp. 25-28. For an interesting inter-
pretation of an animal 's mind, cf., Stuart Chase, The 
Tyranny of Words (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1938), 
pp. 46-56. Langer means that an animal's mind is realistic 
in the way vlhich Chase suggests, and which she quotes, i .• e., 
"that erroneous identifications in human beings are pickled 
and preserved in words, and so not subject to the constant 
check of the environment, as in the case of cats and ele-
phants." In commenting on this, Langer says that: "The 
eat's world is not falsified by the beliefs and poetic fig-
ments that language creates, nor his behavior unbalanced by 
the bootless rites and sacrifices that characterize religion, 
art, and other vagaries of a word-mongering mind." 
2. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 32. 
typically human form of overt activity; and that 
is just what we find in the sheer expression of 
ideas. This is the activity of which beasts ap-
pear to have no need. And it accounts for just 
those traits in man which he does not hold in 
common with the other animals--ritual, art, laugh-
ter, weeping, speech, superstition, and scientific 
genius.l 
The basic and distinctly human need is accordingly 
the need of man to transform his experience into meaning-
ful symbols whereby he can conceive that experience. Con-
ception, however, is not the same \vhen it occurs in response 
to art as when in response to speech. To understand better 
what Langer means by "the sheer expression of ideas," the 
important distinction which she makes between discursive 
and presentational symbols rieeds to be presented. 
iii. Discursive and Presentational Symbols 
Language is the ordinary vehicle of discursive 
symbolism. Thoughts that can be verbalized involve a 
succession from one to the other, a sequence from one idea 
to the next until a total meaning is built up. "Discur-
sive" refers to the fact that, "all discourse is a device 
for concatenating intuitions, getting from one to another, 
and building up the greater intuitive apperception of a 
total Gestalt, or ideal whole.n2 Discursive language is 
1. Ibid., p. 34. 
2. Problems of Art (Nevi York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1957), p. 166. 
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the symbolic form of science, logic, and philosophy. 
Many logicians and linguists maintain that the limits 
of discursive language are the limits of human knov,rledge. 
Anything that cannot be formulated in discursive language 
cannot be known, and is simply symptomatic of feelings 
and the pushes and pulls of subjective emotions.l There-
fore~ "so long as we admit only discursive symbolism as a 
bearer of ideas , 'thought' in this restricted sense must 
be regarded as our only intellectual activity.n2 
Contrary to such limited notions of "thought," 
Langer thinks that there are things that cannot be formu-
lat ed in discursive speech, but which require for their 
expression another symbolism. These nt hingstt are the 
sensory forms which the sense organs abstract from sensory 
experience and through which the experience is conceived 
as an object.3 Because the sense organs themselves are 
instruments of abstraction, sense experience involves 
formulation--it is not a passive reception of impressions. 
The senses tend to organize the sense-field into patterns 
and groups, so that instead of perceiving a flux of im-
29. 
pressions what is perceived is the forms of things. Langer 
1. Philoso£hy in a New Key, pp. 65-70. In this con-
nection ; Langer cites the work of Wittgenstein, Carnap and 
Russell. 
2. Ibid., p. 71. 
3. Ibid., p. 72. 
holds, then, that "all sensitivity bears the stamp of 
mentality," and is formulative of so-called sense-data. 
Sense experience does not issue in the accumulation of 
individual impressions (which are then supposedly com-
bined to constitute a whole) but rather in the perception 
of a whole, pattern, or Gestalt.l It is these patterns, 
or forms, furnished by purely sensory appreciation, that 
provide symbolic materials for a non-discursive symbolism. 
In fact, sensory forms per se are not amenable to discur-
sive (linguistic) symbolization. 
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Visual forms, for example, are grasped in a single 
act of seeing, not through successive acts in which differ-
ent meanings accrue to each term in the perception. For 
this reason the complexity of visual forms "is not limited, 
a s the complexity of discourse is limited, by what the 
mind can retain from the beginning of an apperceptive act 
to the end of it.n2 Ideas that are too subtle for speech, 
e. g ., that include too many infinitesimal but interrelated 
parts, and relations within relations, cannot be trans-
formed into discursive language.3 
But these ideas can be transformed into a present-
ational s~nbolism. Such a symbolism is a direct presentation 
1. Ibid., p. 73. 
2. Ibid., p. 75. 
3. Ibid. 
of individual objects; it does not convey meanings vvhich 
are successively grasped and then combined into a whole 
through discursive processes. As distinguished from the 
discursive symbolism of l anguage, in presentational sym-
bolism: 
The meanings of all ••• symbolic elements that 
compose a larger, articulate symbol are under-
stood only through the meaning of the whole, 
through their relations within the total struc-
ture. Their very functioning as symbols depends 
on the fact that they are involved in a· simultane-
ous integral presentation. 
In recognizing presentational symbols as conveyors of 
meaning, Langer rejects the view, cited above, that ex-
perience incapable of discursive formulation is meaning-
less, or simply the self-expression of subjective states. 
All the more is this true for Langer inasmuch as nno symbol 
is exempt from the office of logical formulation, or con-
ceptualizing what it conveys. "2 
The peculiar meaning of presentational (expressive) 
symbols in art, i.e., the conceptions they convey, is most 
important for Langer's view of the aesthetic object. 
Since, however, the r.vay in which presentational symbols 
come to have "meaning," and the nature of their relation 
to subjective life, is the subject of a later section of 
this chapter, the matter is not pursued further here. In 
l. Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
2. Ibid., p. 79. 
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this place it is sufficient to note that Langer has put 
forward the concept of a presentational symbolism in con-
junction \'lith the follo'\\ring hypothesis: "The order of 
perceptual forms Lffiaz7 be a • • • principle for symboli-
zation, and hence the qonception, expression, and appre-
hension, of impulsive, instinctive, and sentient life.nl 
The main points in this section may be summarized 
as follows: 
Meaning is a function of terms and can be specified 
in two different types of functions: sign function, which 
involves three terms: subject, sign, and object, and which 
always is a symptom of an actual state of affairs; and 
symbol function, which involves four terms: subject, sym-
bol, conception, and object, and which is not a proxy for 
a state of affairs but a vehicle for its conception. 
It was pointed out that language did not originate 
primarily as an instrument for communication, but for the 
purpose of symbolizing experience. The human mind, in 
turn, is not essentially an instrument for successful 
biological adaptation, but rather manifests the unique 
human need to symbolize reality. 
Discursive symbolism, which takes the form of lan-
guage and proceeds successively from one idea to another, 
1. !Qi£., pp. 79-80. 
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was distinguished from presentational symbolism, which is 
the organization of basic sensory forms for their concep-
tion in a single act of apprehension. 
With this analysis of symbolical transformation, 
which is implicit in and essential to Langer's theory o:f 
art, the thesis novl considers her theory of artistic crea-
tion and the art symbol. 
4. Artistic Creation and the Art Symbol 
Why is a piece of music a creation and a shoe usu-
ally just a product? The distinction, though it 
is protested by some philosophers who are anxious 
champions of democracy, like John Dewey, is a com-
monly accepted one •••• We don't create bricks, 
aluminum pots, or toothpaste; we simply make such 
things. But we create illforks of art •••• The dif-
ference between creation and other productive work 
is this: an ordinary object, say a shoe, is made 
by putting pieces of leather together; the pieces 
were there before. The shoe is a construction of 
leather. It has a special shape and use and name, 
but it is still an article of leather, and is thought 
of as such. A picture is made by deploying pigments 
on a piece of canvas, but the picture is not a pig-
ment-and-canvas structure. The picture that emerges 
from the process is a structure of space, and the 
space itself is an emergent whole of shapes, visi-
ble colored volumes. Neither the space nor the 
things in it were in the room before.l 
As will be seen presently, the material just quoted 
provides an ample introduction to what Langer means by 
"creation, 11 and to what she means by "art symbol." Be-
cause Langer approaches art from the nstudio standpoint,u 
1. Problems of Art, pp. 27-28. 
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the clarification of the meaning of "creation" and "sym-
bol" are central to her approach. The first of her ideas 
for analysis from this perspective is what she calls 
nsemblance." 
i. Semblance 
The object created by the artist, be it a poem, a 
vase, an opera, or a drama, is variously termed a "sem-
blance," an "image," an "illusion," an "appearance," 
and/or a "virtual entity.nl What Langer wishes to stress 
by the use of these terms is that the art object is wholly 
created, is an abstraction from reality, and exists for 
perception alone.2 An object existing for perception alone 
is a virtual entity; a painting, for exmnple, as art ob-
ject, is disengaged from its natural surroundings and 
causal relations, from all of its characteristics as an 
actual entity, and thereby is seen purely in terms of its 
sensory qualities--as an appearance. 
Remembering that Langer defines a symbol as "any 
device whereby we are enabled to make an abstraction,n 
it may no\<T be pointed out that abstraction is the initial 
step in artistic creation. Abstraction, as seen in the 
discussion of non-discursive symbolic materials, is implicit 
1. Ibid., p. 148 et passim. 
2. Ibid., p. 50. 
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in perception itself. In art, as in logic, "'abstraction' 
is the recognition of a relational struct,ure, or form, 
apart from the specific thing • • • in which it is exem-
plified.nl The forms of things are not the things them-
selves, in combination, but are their patterns as they 
appear to sense as pre-discursive wholes. Abstraction is 
the basic step essential to the creation of artistic form. 
All forms in art ••• are abstracted forms; 
their content is only a semblance, a pure ap-
pearance, whose function is to make them • • • 
apparent--more freely and wholly apparent than 
they could be if they were exemplified in a 
context of real circumstance and anxious in-
terest. 2 
When Langer refers to the created semblance as a 
realm of "illusion,n she does not mean delusion.3 By 
"illusionn she refers to the wholly created and abstractive 
nature of the art object. The separate arts are defined 
by the types of illusion they create, not by their sepa-
rate use of materials or tools for artistic creation. 
nEach art begets a special dimension of experience that 
is a special kind of image of reality,"4 and it is this 
"special kind of image of reality" that constitutes the 
primary illusion of each art. 
1. Ibid., P• 163. 
2. Feeling and Form, p. 50. 
J. Ibid., .pp. xi, 65. 
4. Problems of Art, p. 81. 
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In plastic art, for example, spatial organization 
is not of the everyday experiential space of sight and 
touch, but is rather of a wholly created, or yirtual 
space. Virtual space is the primary illusion of plastic 
art; it is discontinuous with any actual space and is 
"entirely self-contained and independent."l What is 
created in plastic art, then, is the semblance of space, 
which might equally well be termed the basic abstraction 
of plastic art. It is important to note that the sem-
blance created is not a re-creation, but is "entirely 
created." The passage cited above puts the matter clearly: 
"Neither the space nor the things in it were in the room 
before." 
Langer's doctrine of semblance may be further 
illustrated by application to music. The primary illusion 
of music is vital, experiential time, the semblance and 
illusion of "lived" time.2 Just as in the plastic arts 
where space is virtual, not actual, so in music, time 
becomes virtual. Thus, for Langer, music is the semblance 
of "lived" time, and time in this sense is its primary 
1. Ibid., p. 72. 
2. Feeling and For~, p. 109. 
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illusion.l 
In the terms of this section on semblance, what 
art creates, broadly put, isthe semblance of life. The 
created semblance is an illusion, an image, a virtual ob-
ject, in short, the appearance of life. However, so far, 
although it is clear that such a semblance is abstracted 
from life, and is independent and entirely created, it is 
not clear how it c an be a s emblance of life, or even about 
lif e. This question is treated in the follovli ng two sec-
tions, dealing with express~ve form and si gnificant form 
respectively. 
ii. Expressive Form 
Although all forms in art are abstracted forms, 
.Langer is not saying at the same time that abstract form 
per se is the aim of art. The created semblance is not 
l. Langer defines all the other arts in terms of 
their primary illusions, e.g., narrative creates a virtual 
past, the drama a virtual future, while the illusion of 
life is the primary illusion of all literature, etc •• 
Since this way of defining the separate arts would require 
lengthy expo.sition in order to be adequately treated in 
this thesis, the subject is not further pursued herein. It 
is hoped that the illustrations given are sufficient to 
make the principle of definition clear. An interesting as-
pect, perhaps an advantage to Langer's principle of defini-
tion, may be noted. Because a work of art can exist in 
only one primary illusion; there can be no hybrid arts. 
For example; words, actions, or even the dance, may enter 
into music, but as musical elements. These elements are 
assimilated by the music, or ought to be. Thus, opera, 
for exrunple, is not a hodge-podge of music, drama, dance, 
and poetry, but is music that "s\"Vallows'' these other ele-
ments. Cf. Feeling and Form, pp. 150-66. 
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a void abstraction, totally unrelated to life. It is 
constituted by the relations of its qualities which are 
integral to it. The qualities, or "content," cannot be 
separated from the form, for they are what make it ex-
pressive form, rather than just form.l This section is 
a consideration of form from the perspective of its ex-
pressiveness. 
The art object has the expressive function of a 
presentational symbol, i.e., the direct presentation of 
an object. The idea that a presentational symbol embodies 
is an idea about sentient life, about feelings and emo-
tions.2 But the artistic object, as a pure appearance, is 
the semblance of life felt and lived, therefore not its 
direct expression. 
Langer says that music, for example, is not at tended 
by self-expressions of emotion and feeling. Her reason 
for saying this is that "sheer self-expression requires no 
artistic form."3 
A l ynching-party howling round the gallows-tree, 
a woman wringing her hands over a sick child, a 
lover who has just rescued his sweetheart i n an 
l. Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
2. Problems of Art, p. 126 et passim. The nature 
of sentient life, of emotions, feelings, and their rela-
tion to the aesthetic object, is considered in a later 
section of this chapter, cf. below, pp. 42-49. 
3. Philosophy i n a New Key, p. 175. 
accident and stands trembling, • • • crying with 
emotion, is giving vent to intense feelings; but 
such scenes are not olcasions for music, least 
of all for composing. . 
Furthermore, Langer asks how it would be possible for 
artists to perform music if the self-expression theory 
is correct: 
The fact is, that we can ~ music to work off 
our subjective experiences and restore our per-
sonal balance, but this is not its primary func-
t ion. Were it so, it would be utterly impossible 
for an artist to announce a program in advance, 
and expect to play it well; or even, having an-
nounced it on the spot, to express himself suc-
cessively in allegro, adagio, presto, and 
allegretto.2 
Emotions and feelings, nevertheless, while they are not 
directly expressed in art, do have a very important place 
in artistic creation. 
The artistic object has an emotional content, but 
it has it symbolically, i.e., it is about emotions and 
is the semblable presentation of them. Feelings and emo-
tions in art are not effects of the personal life of the 
artist but are formulations of his knowledge about emo-
tions. Indeed, Langer rules out the possibility that an 
artist could create and at the same time experience 
directly the emotive content of what he is creating--
at the same time. nThe feeling in a \'Vork of art is 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 176. 
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something the artist conceived as he created the symbolic 
form to present it, rather than something he was under-
going and involuntarily venting in an artistic process."l 
The artist creates an expressive form, then, which shows 
or reveals the semblance of emotive lifee 
The controlling factor in artistic creation is 
not the artist's emotive experience per se, but his con-
ception of the form it is to assume in the work to be 
created. In music, for instance, the initial phase in 
the growth of a work consists of the idea, or Gestalt, 
the composer has of the total form to be realized in the 
work. It is this idea which guides and controls the com-
poser in working out further development of the composi-
tion. 
Once the essential musical form is found, a 
piece of music exists in embryo; it is implicit 
there, although its final, completely articu-
late character is not determined yet, beca_use 
there are many possible ways of developing the 
composition. Yet in the whole process of sub-
sequent invention and elaboration, the general 
Gestalt serves as a measure of right and wrong, 
too much and too little, strong and weak. One 
migbt call that original conception the command-
ing form of the work.2 
The commanding form of a work, therefore, represents the 
idea of the work-to-be-created as it is "in the artist's 
1. Feeling and Form, p. 176. 
2. !£!£., p. 122. 
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head.nl 
However, this commanding form is not the control-
ling factor in artistic creation in the sense that it 
limits strictly what the artist can do and cannot do: 
"The commanding form is not ·essentially restrictive, but 
fecund.n2 It is fecund in the sense that it is the oc-
casion for the artist to explore the possibilities it 
offers to him. 
In handling his own creation ••• he Lthe artist7 
learns from the perceptible reality before him 
possibilities of subjective experience that he 
has not known in his personal life. His own men-
tal scope and the growth and expansion of his 
personality are, therefore, deeply involved with 
his art.3 
The artist, then, is further controlled by the nature of 
his own v10rk-in-progress, insofar at least as it offers 
him fresh perspectives for formal development. 
For the reason that "all knowledge goes back to 
experience; Land? that we cannot know anything that bears 
no relation to our experience,n an artist does not appre-
hend form ~ nihilo.4 He apprehends it in many relations, 
one of which is to his personal life. But his own subjec-
tive experience is not in the artistic object as 
1. Ibid., p. 389. 
2. Ibid., p. 123. 
3. Ibid., p. 390. 
4. Ibid., p. 392. 
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unmitigated self-expression. It is related to the com-
manding form of the work only insofar as it is transformed 
into artistic materials in the commanding form. A fortiori, 
subjective elements in the expressive form may never have 
actually occurred in the artist's life. They may be only 
imagined emotions and feelings, for the artistic object is 
a semblance of imaginable subjective life.l Thus, subjec-
tive factors in the artist's own life are positively related 
to the form he creates, whether he has directly experienced 
them or only imagined them. 
A tacit assumption in this section on expressive 
form has been that the emotive content of art symbolizes 
everyday feelings and emotions. Art, in some way, is re-
lated to feeling. The nature of this relation is the next 
point for attention. 
iii. Significant Form2 
In the preceding section the distinction between 
self-expression and expressiveness, and the role of emotions 
1. Problems of Art., p. 113. 
2. This is a term used by Clive Bell to define the 
none quality common to all works of visual art." Holrrever, 
since Bell insisted that ·"to appreciate a work of art vve 
need bring with us nothing from life," it seemed as if 
"significant Form" \'lere in fact significant of nothing. 
Cf. Melvin Rader (ed.), A Modern Book of Aesthetics (rev. 
ed.; New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), pp. 312-31. 
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and feelings in art was given attention. That section 
considered "what" expressive form is. In this section 
and the following one, t.he questions of "how" and "why'' 
expressive form is expressive are considered. That is, 
the question is how and why "the idea that a presenta-
tional symbol embodies is an idea about sentient life, 
about feelings and emot ions. " 
Langer believes that there is a symbolic (conno-
tative) relation between the nature of subjective experi-
ence and the nature of form in art. The relationship 
between subjective patterns of feeling and the forms in 
art can be viewed as a symbolical relation if it can be 
sho~m that in art there are formal characteristics simi-
lar to the patterns of feeling.l Langer suggests that 
this similarity has already been pointed out by many 
researchers, and "that musical structures logically re-
semble certain dynamic patterns of human experience is a 
~tell-established fact. n 2 She cites the researches of 
Kohler and D'Udine to this effect, and concludes that, 
there are certain aspects of the so-called "inner-
life"--physical or mental--which have formal prop-
erties similar to tho se of music--patterns of 
1. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 183. 
2. Ibid. Although Langer here speaks of "musical 
structures, n the term "artistic" might fairly be substi-
tuted for "musical . n Her theory of musical significance 
~·~- Philosophy in a New Key is developed and expanded to 
apply to all the arts. 
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notion and rest, of tension and release, of 
agreement and disagreement~ preparation, ful-
filment, excitation, sudden change, etc •• 1 
Music can, then, be construed as a symbolism at 
least insofar as it displays a logical form similar to 
the forms of "inner-life." But music is not a symbolism 
in tht~ language sense; it has no set vocabulary, gram.rnar, 
or syntax. Numerous critics of the view of music as a 
symbolism have pointed out that it is difficult if not 
impos:>ible to assign a nameable feeling to a musical 
piece. Indeed, they have insisted that even the most 
elemental feelings cannot be distinctly rendered in music, 
and t :1at "one cannot prove every musical phrase or figure 
to me.:m some nameable feeling, memory, or idea," so that 
unles3 this is done, symbolization cannot account for 
the essence of either art or music.2 
These critics are mistaken, according to Langer, 
in the belief that every symbolism must make the dis-
tinctions made in discursive symbolism. If musical ex-
press iveness is to merely duplicate the names given to 
emotiJns by ordinary discursive language, then music 
would have to be viewed as a discursive symbolism. In 
addition, Langer feels that the criticism that music does 
not n:une emotions is, in fact, the "strength of musical 
expressiveness: that music articulates forms which 
1. Ibid. , pp. 183-85. 2. Ibid., p. 189. 
44 
language cannot set forth.l And, if musical forms cannot 
be di :)cursively formulated, it follows that rrmusic, and 
probahly all art--is formally and essentially untrans-
latab:.e. n 2 
The classifications and distinctions made in dis-
cursive language prohibit the namtng of all facets of the 
inner·-life, of all shades of emotion, and the complex re-
lations of feeling. Musical forms are more consonant with 
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the forms of feeling than are the forms of literal language, 
and for this reason nmusic can ~eal the nature of feelings 
with H detail and truth that language cannot approach."3 
But music does not reveal specific: emotions and feelings, 
in thH sense, say, that a musical piece represents a par-
ticular emotion. The problem would immediately arise of 
expla:.ning how some musical pieces can be interpreted as 
both aad and happy, or gay and somber, for example. 
Langel·' s theory avoids this problem by denying that music 
repreBents particular emotions. Vlhat it reflects, instead, 
is thE~ structure of human emotions. nwhat music can actu-
ally Peflect is only the morphology of feeling; and it is 
quite plausible that some sad and happy conditions may have 
1. Ibid., p. 189. 
2. Ibid. , p. 190. 
3. Ibid., p . 191. Cf. below, pp. 57-59 , for the 
sense in which Langer here uses the word "truth." 
a very similar morphology.nl The significance of "sig-
nificant form , " then, is emotive, and is possible because 
of the similarity and congruence between musical forms 
and the forms of hmnan feeling.2 This significance Langer 
terms "vital import,n in order to distinguish it from the 
conventional meanings of language. Thus, music does not 
~ 11 this emotion 11 or "that emotion," but has vital im-
port, where the word vital refers to the dynamic qualities 
of subjective experience. 
The basis of the relation wherein artistic forms 
have status as symbols whose significance (vital import) 
is the sentient life of human beings, is found in the 
nature of the "life of feeling," since it manifests formal 
characteristics similar to musical forms. 
1. Ibid., p. 193. 
2. Charles L. Stevenson interprets Langer to mean 
·that this congruence is an isomorphism between the forms 
in mu~ic and the emotions music symbolizes. By isomorphism 
Stever..son means that musical forms and emotions could have 
"such a correspondence between their elements, and such a 
corre~pondence between certain relations holding between 
these elements," that the forms of music would be isomor-
phic -vdth the emotions. However, he feels that Langer's 
view "about the 'morphological similarity' bet\veen music 
and the emotions ••• needs to be formulated much more 
specifically.n He also says that when Langer goes beyond 
the similarity between musical and emotional "tensions 
and resolutions ••• she becomes altogether general and 
indefinite." For Stevenson's argument, cf. Paul Henle 
(ed.), Language, Thought, & Culture (Ann Arbor: The Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 196-225. 
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Human beings do not merely have sensations and 
feelings in isolation, without any activity to give them 
unity: "It is the continuity of thought that systematizes 
our enotional reactions into attitudes v-1i th distinct feel-
ing tones."l This accounts for the fact that we have not 
only feelings but a life of feeling. 
That life of feeling is a stream of tensions and 
resolutions. Probably all emotion, all feeling 
tone, mood, and even personal "sense of life" or 
"sense of identity" is a specialized and intri-
cate, but definite interplay of tensions--actual, 
nervous, and muscular tensions taking place in a 
human organism.2 
The ., stream of tensions and resolutionsn is what Langer 
means when she talks about a life of feeling, or the 
inner-life. Sh~ also means the subjective unity of ex-
perience, which in art becomes the semblance of organic 
unity. 
The subject of organic unity, its relation to art 
and subjective life, is the final topic for consideration 
in 1;his section. 
iv. Organic Form 
In art, the organic nature of physical existence, 
e.g., organic processes such as life, growth, development, 
decline, and death, is transfonned into dyn~~ic forms of 
1. Feeling and Form, p. 372. 
2. Ibid. 
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feelin.g~ Thus, "instead of metabolism, rhythmic pro-
gression, instead of stimulus and response, completeness, 
instead of maturation, fulfillment, instead of procrea-
tion, the repetition of the whole in the parts.nl Since 
feeljngs are related and remembered, and imagined, the 
life of feeling is a "vital organization" of feelings in 
and through thought. 
The vital organization of physical existence is 
achi,~ved through the rhythmic continuity of all organic 
life. Langer defines rhythm as "the setting-up of new 
tensions by the resolution of former ones," and cites the 
exam·::>les of breathing and the heartbeat. 2 It is the con-
tinuity of rhythm in organic processes, wherein the build-
up of one tension is contained in 'the close of its 
predecessor , that accounts for the patterns of change in 
living organisms. And a pattern of change, in feeling 
tone for instance, does not involve a succession of in-
dependent feelings, but their rhythmic progression. Feel-
ing~:, inasmuch as they occur only in living organisms, 
shar·e in the vital processes of organic life. The sig-
nifj.cance of this is that the "logic of all symbols that 
can express feeling is the logic of organic processes."3 
1. Ibid., p. 312. 
2. Ibid., p. 127. 
J. Ibid. , p. 126. 
The organic unity of form that is usually attributed to 
artietic objects is therein related to the ordinary pro-
cessE!S of life. 
Although a work of art may abstract from the 
temporal character of experience, what it ren-
ders in its own logical projection must be true 
in design to the structure of experience. That 
is why art seems essentially organic; for all 
vital tension patterns are organic patterns. 
It must be remembered, of course, that a work 
of art is not an actual organism, but presents 
only the appearance of life, growth, and func-
tional unity •••• But because the created ap-
pearance is all that has organic structure, a 
work of art shows us the appearance of life; and 
the semblance of functional unity is indispens-
able if the illusory tension pattern is to con-
note felt tensions, human experience.l 
It is the organic form in art which accounts for its 
vital import, for its quality of "livingness." 
Expressive, significant, and organic form are all 
of ~ - piece, for it is the similarity of their logic al 
strcctures with the logical form of human experience, 
that. gives them their vital import, that makes them 
amenable to presenting and revealing life as it is lived. 
The composed apparition2 • • • is not a report 
or comment, but a constructed form; if it is a 
good ••• work it is an expressive form • • • 
by virtue of the tensions and resolutions, bal-
ances and asymmetries among its own elements, 
which beget the illusion of organic nature that 
artists call "living form. nJ 
1. Ibid., p. 373. 
2. The "composed apparition" is the artistic object. 
3. Problems of Art, p. 148. 
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5. Aesthetic Appreciation 
From the preceding portions of this thesis there 
are many irnplici t suggestions as to Nhat Langer believes 
characteristic aesthetic activity to be. Given that 
symbols function as vehicles of conception, and that 
pres ·~ntational symbols, although non-discursive, are 
not ~xempt from conceptualizing their import, it is not 
a f a r step to see that conception itself is for Langer 
the :nost fundamental activity of aesthetic appreciation. 
The nature of aesthetic conception is the first subject 
for analysis here. 
i. Conception 
Artistic creation, as has been pointed out, does 
not directly convey emotions through the self-expression 
of the artist. What the artist does convey is his know-
ledge about emotions, and his means of conveyance is 
symt·olical formulation and articulation. Hence, what a 
work of art invites us to do is to conceive the artist's 
idec: t in his created work . The 
feelings revealed • • • are essentially not 
"the passion, love or l onging of such- and-such 
an individual,n inviting us to put ours elves 
in that individual's place, but are presented 
directly to our understanding, that we may grasp, 
realize, comprehend these feelings, without 
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pretending to have them or imputing them to 
anyone else.l , 
Lang,:lr goes on to explain that Edward Bullough' s idea 
o f nDsychical distancen does not make the emotive contents 
in a:rt impersonal, "but makes them conceivable, so that 
we c~n envisage and understand them without verbal helps, 
and ·qi thout the scaffolding of an occasion wherein they 
figu:-e. n2 Appreciation of the forms in art does not mean 
that the appreciator must experience the emotions they 
formulate, but means that he is presented with an idea 
of what such emotions are like, which in turn is under-
stood conceptually. 
When artistic effects are taken as feelings, and 
resronded to as such, the aesthetic percipient has mis-
taken the aesthetic symbol for a sign. If the aesthetic 
symtol were a sign of actual feelings and emotions, then 
the aesthetic response would be the appropriate emotive 
beh~Yior in reaction to the emotions signified by the 
symbol. The effects of art, however, are only like 
feelings, but are not the feelings themselves. The 
1. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 180. The contrast 
of t.his statement with Tolstoy's vie\'l of art (as the com-
munication of emotion), is too striking not to mention. 
Tol~;toy says that "it is on ffihe7 capacity of man to re-
ceive another man's expression of feeling, and experience 
tho~:e feelings himself, that the activity of art is based." 
Cf. Melvin Rader (ed . ), A Modern Book of Aesthetics (rev. 
ed.: New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), pp. 185-92. 
2. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 180. 
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func·::.ion of symbolical forms in art is, then) to make 
feellngs conceivable, rather than their direct stimula-
tion. The emotional response confuses si gri, function and 
symh)l function, and takes what is only a pure appear-
ance, a semblance of life, to be a sign of an actual 
state of affairs. 1 
The tendency to emotional response to art reveals 
a further failure to If distance" · the object so that its 
vital import can be conceived. In addition, it shows 
the more important failure to abstract the symbolic fona 
so that it can be seen per se, not for what it might be 
taken to represent. The significance of significant form 
is not seen mediately through the form, but is seen in 
the form. In plastic art, 11 the dynamic form of feeling 
is ~een in the picture, not through it mediately; the 
feeling itself seems to be in the picture. Symbolic 
forrll, symbolic function, and symbolized import are all 
1. The principle for this confusion has been set 
fort.h by Ernst Cassirer, whom Langer quotes as follows: 
"It is typical of the first naive, unreflective manifesta-
tions of linguistic thinking as 'l.'iell as the mythical con-
scic,usness, that its content is not sharply divided into 
symbol and object, but both tend to unite in a perfectly 
undifferentiated fusion." (Trans. by Langer) Langer points 
out that this is the same principle that issues in mythical 
beliefs, the ascribing of powers to names denoting power, 
and the taking of sacraments to be efficacious. In art, 
the principle literally results in the mistaking of the 
aest.hetic object for reality. Cf. Philosophy in a New Key, 
pp. 197-99. 
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tele:3coped into one experience. nl And, for this reason, 
a woJ·k of art does not signify a meaning apart from 
\ 
itself. The expressive form cannot be apprehended sep-
arat3ly from the s~nsuous form that expresses it. Thus, 
the ·i1'ital import of a work is seen in the work, or not 
at all. Rather than emotive response, the characteristic 
aest~etic response is the abstraction of the form of the 
work, and the conception of the artist's idea in that 
form • 
.., 
The act of conception is, therefore, the basic 
characteristic of aesthetic appreciation. Langer also 
uses t .he terms ncontemplation, n "cognition, n and nimagina-
tion" to describe appreciation. Her emphasis in using 
these terms is that so-called aesthetic nexperiencen is 
not an active undergoing of emotional states so much as 
it is the cognizance of what emotional states feel like. 
For example, she says: 
When we say that a work has a definite feeling 
about it, we do not mean that it either symp-
tomizes this feeling, as weeping symptomizes an 
emotional disturbance in the weeper, nor that it 
stimulates us to feel a certain way. What we 
mean is that it presents a feeling for our con-
templation. 2 
The feelings in art are imagined feelings, and when Langer 
use~ . terms like contemplation, distance, cognition, or 
1. Problems of Art, p. 34. 
2. Ibid., p. 95. 
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conc,:lption, this is what she has in mind. 
Aesthetic conception is, however (like artistic 
cone ~ pti on) non-discursive.. The conception of significant 
for~ in art does not issue in propositions about inner-
life, but rather gives a non-propositional understanding 
of wjat the aspect of that life is like that the artist 
happens to be dealing with. The vehicle for this non-
prop~sitional understanding is intuition. 
ii. Intuition 
Although characteristic aesthetic activity is 
conceptual, it is not conceptual in the normal sense of 
"con cept" or Tfidea." An idea is the result of discursive , 
linguistic, synthetic construction. Aesthetic conception , 
on the other hand, begins with an understanding or seizure 
of the total import of the aesthetic object. It may be 
increased by continued contemplation of the object as its 
expressive form becomes increasingly visible; its develop-
ment is similar to that of the "commanding form" of the 
artist. This total grasp of the object is what Langer 
means by intuition. 
Contemplation, conception, or cognition, are words 
that stress the intellectual aspect of aesthetic apprecia-
tior.. The word intuition is used to emphasize the non-
discursive, non-propositional, and non-linguistic nature 
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of a3sthetic perception. Positively, intuition is the 
same thing that Locke had in mind by nnatural light," 
i.e., the simple recognition that two and two are four, 
that black is not white, etc •• In art, all conception 
of ~Jrm is intuitive. 
All cognition of form is intuitive; all relatedness-
distinctness, congruence, correspondenc e of forms , 
contrast, and synthesis in a total Gestalt--can be 
known only by direct insight, which is intuition. 
And not only form, but formal significance, or 1 import, is seen intuitively ••• or not at all. 
The intuition of formal significance, however, is not 
opposed to logic and intellect, but is indeed the most 
basic logical and intellectual process. 
Discursive reasoning, and its formulation in sue-
cessive propositions, is a way of getting from one intui-
tion to another, and finally to more and more complex 
ideas built up from the separate intuitions. While dis-
cursive meanings are constructed by passage from one 
simple intuition to another, artistic import (the coun-
terr:art of discursive meaning) cannot be constructed, or 
synthesized, but, "must be seen i_ toto first." The 
"'understanding' of a work of art begins with an intuition 
of the whole presented feeling.n2 It is, therefore, im-
possible to translate vital import into discursive-
1. Feeling and Form, p. 378. 
2. Ibid., p. 379 . 
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lin~1istic meanings. 
Since both artistic form and its a esthetic appre-
ciation entail intuition, the expressive forms in art 
cann)t be demonstrated by the canons of discursive 
reas)ning. Rather than demonstrating, commenting, or 
comrnllnicating anything, what the artist does is to "re-
veal" or ttshown an appearance of felt-life. Since the 
significance of the work cannot be seen apart from its 
expressive form, the relation of the appreciator is to 
the work, not to the artist as a personality. If the 
aesthetic response were to give attention to what the 
artist "communicates, n what his ncomments" are, or what 
he is "saying, tt then attention would be to something 
extraneous to the expressive form itself.1 Also, this 
sort of response would preclude aesthetic contemplation 
of the formal significance, which is seen in the work. 
Intuition in art, then, is a direct recognition of formal 
significance, and springs from the logical congruence of 
expressive artistic forms and the forms of subjective ex-
perience. As such, intuition in art is logical in the 
most fundamental sense, i.e., it is a simple awareness of 
forrral relatedness, congruence, and correspondence, in 
and through the appreciation of symbolic structures as 
symtolic. 
1. Ibid;, pp. 394-95. 
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Since intuition in art is 11 logical," and is the 
perception of expressive form, which in turn is signifi-
cant of subjective life, the intuition in art is by no 
means meaningless. Although this intuition is not true 
or false in the propositional sense, Langer does maintain 
that the intuition of artistic import may be true in a 
very special sense . 
6. Artistic Truth 
As shown earlier in this thesis, symbolic expres-
sion may take either one of two forms: the discursive 
or the presentational. It is Langer's thesis that since 
there are two symbolical forms, it is at least possible 
that there may be two meanings to·the word "truth." Re-
gardless of how epistemology may define discursive truth, 
it is generally agreed that propositions, as the products 
of discursive reasoning, are either true or false. But 
Langer feels that it is a mistake to limit the word truth 
only. to the results of discursive reasoning. 
Lacking the logical form in which to convey pro-
positional truth, art can nevertheless convey "artistic 
truth. 11 Here, essentially, is Langer's contention: 
TTArtistJ.c truthn ••• is the truth of a symbol 
to the forms of feeling--namele s s forms, but 
recognizable when they appear in sensuous rep-
lica. Such truth, being bound to certain logical 
forms ofexpression, has logical peculiarities 
that distinguish it from propositional truth: 
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since presentational symbols have no negatives, 
there is no operation whereby their truth-value 
is reversed, no contradiction. Hence "the pos-
sibility of expressing opposites simultane-
ously. nl 
Further, whereas propositional truth admits of no degrees, 
being true Q£ false, artistic truth is perhaps always a 
matter of degrees of being true. The expressive object, 
as an appearance of subjective life, gives us knowledge 
about that life, and it may be more or less adequate in 
its expressive function, and therefore more or less true 
to the life of feeling. 2 In addition, since art has no 
consequences that are operationally testable, and because 
its import cannot be demonstrated, the truth of art can-
not be verified by either reasoning or tests as to its 
practical value. 
Langer's theory accounts for both artistic and 
propositional truth, and does not set up a rigid dichot-
omy between them--at least not in the sense that truth 
can be predicated only of propositions, leaving artistic 
uttErances as meaningless. She believes that this is 
one factor to recommend her theory to epistemologists. 
The limits of language are not the last limits 
of experience, and things inaccessible to lan-
guage may have their own forms of conception , 
that is to say, their own symbolic devices. 
1. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 214. 
2. Ibid. 
Such non-discursive forms, charged with 
logical possibilities of meaning, underlie 
the significance of music.l 
Because art symbols can be true to the life of 
feeling, art serves a very important social function. 
The ~elation of art to society is the final subject 
for consideration in this chapter. 
7. Art and Society 
In this section the leading question is that of 
the social importance of art for the general life of man 
in society. Since much of Langer's aesthetics is de-
signed to achieve for art a place of intellectual re-
spectability, as opposed to theories which see it as 
mere pleasure, or play, or, indeed, as human folly re-
sulting from a miscarriage of human reason, it is perhaps 
natural that she sees some form of art as essential to 
the health of any social community and culture. 
Art is a public possession, because the formula-
tion of 'felt life' is the heart of any culture, 
and molds the objective world for the people. 
It is their school of feeling, and their defense 
against outer and inner chaos. It is only when 
nature is organized in imagination along lines 
congruent with the forms of feeling th2t we can 
understand it, i.e., find it rational. 
Art has the co gnitive value of giving "self-
knovrledge, insight into all phases of life and 
1. Ibid., pp. 215-16. 
2. Feeling and Form, p. 409. 
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mind,"l and it is thus a nschool of feeling" in the 
sense that in giving form to emotive experience (which 
otherwis~ is irrational) it makes emotions apparent and 
understandable. Far from being the plaything of a cul-
ture, or a mere cultural frill, Langer declares that 
"art is the education of the senses to see nature in 
expressive form," and that "neglect of artistic educa-
tion is neglect in education of feeling.n2 
In addition to having an educational function, 
art has the intellectual and biological functions of 
serving the basic human need for symbolical transforma-
tion of experience. Langer terms mind, "the impulse 
toviard symbolic formulation, expression, and understand-
ing of experience.n3 Furthermore, "we are driven to the 
symtolization and articulation of feeling when we must 
understand ·it to keep ourselves oriented in society and 
nature. u4 
This is true for the reason that man's healthy 
orientation in society depends upon his ability to con-
ceive things, to make them amenable to his understanding. 
l. Problems of Art, p. 71. 
2. Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
3. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 239. 
4. Feeling and Form, p. 245. 
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Bec <: LUS e symbols are vehicles of conception, they are 
essEmtial to understanding and orientation. 
For good or evil, man has [the? po\ver of en-
visagement, which puts on him a burden that 
purely alert, realistic creatures do not bear--
the burden of understanding. • • • So he must 
conceive a world and a law of the world, a 
pattern of life, and a way of meeting death. 
All these things he knows, and he1has to make some adaptation to their reality. 
To achieve this adaptation to the reality of things, 
nom· most important assets are always the symbols of 
our general orientation in • • • society, and in what 
we are doing.n2 
In primitive socieites such symbols were often 
extant in the ritual of common activities, being an 
intr·insic part of the life of the people. Langer feels , 
hm•mver, that such symbols have long been lost to modern 
man: 
In modern society such exercises are all but 
lost. Every person finds his Holy of Holies 
where he may: in Scientific Truth, Evolution , 
the State, Democracy, Kultur, or some meta-
physical word like "the Alln or "the spiri-
tual." •.• This loss of old universal symbols 
endangers our safe unconscious orientation.3 
It :Ls the loss of this orientation, rather than physical 
1.vant, .that threatens the modern mind. With all the "old 
1. Philosophy in a New Ke~, p. 233. 
2. Ibid., pp. 233-34. 
3. Ibid. 
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symbolsn gone, and ·vfith much of art "estranged from" 
the public in museums, and no longer a part of daily 
lifEl, the free functioning of mind, which is symbolical 
fun<:tioning, is jeopardized. What ensues from these 
. conclitions is disorientation, nthe most disastrous hin-
drance [to mind7, the failure or destruction of life-
symbols and loss or repression of votive acts.n1 
In art, however, there are overt symbols which 
con1rey conceptual meaning in terms of vital import. Since 
man has a need for expressive formulation of his life, 
art symbols serve the very important social function of 
ansuering to man's biological and intellectual needs. 
Wi th magical and ritualistic practices (which went to 
fon! the "meaning" of life for primitive societies) 
largely discredited by modern science, art, as a sym-
bol:Lcal projection of experience, offers man a form for 
the understanding of himself and his world. 
8. Summary 
Langer develops her aesthetics from a general 
vie''/ of philosophy, viz., that p~ilosophy is the study 
of' Iaeanings, and is governed by the principle of seeking 
log:Lcal implications from the basic notions derived from 
exporience. The basic notion with which Langer begins 
1. Ibid., p. 236 . 
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in aesthetics is the idea of the transformational and 
symbol-making nature of human understanding. Her the -
oretical aims areto interpret art as a form of symbolism) 
as vrell as to clarify the meanings of many of the terms 
cornnon in aesthetics, e.g., "creation," "import," "ex-
pre:3sion," and "symbol." 
"Meaning" is defined as a. function of terms, and 
may be predicated of two different functions: sign func-
tion, whicp is symptomatic of an actual state of affairs, 
and symbol function, which is a vehicle for the concep-
tion of things. 
Langer rejects pragmatic theories of the origins 
of .3ymbolisrn. She argues that symbolism is the result 
of I~an' s inclination to symbolize reality, which is also 
the unique human -need. 
Language takes the form of discursive symbolism, 
whi,~h is a concatenation of intuitions until an ideal 
whole is constructed. Presentational symbolism, which 
is ·::;he symbolic form of art, is the . direct presentation 
of ~n object for its conception in a single act of appre-
hen3ion. 
What is created in art is a semblance, a wholly 
cre.3.ted appearance of life lived and felt. Because it 
is 1vholly created, an artistic object is an abstraction 
from the actual circumstances of life. 
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Emotions and feelings enter into artistic crea-
tion., not , however, as direct self-expressions of the 
art:.st, but as formulations of the artist's experience 
in virtue of which they are transformed from expressions 
into an expressive form. 
Art reflects and reveals the life of feeling in 
a way that language cannot. This is for the reason that 
the forms in art are consonant with the forms of feeling, 
whereas discursive forms are not. Significant form has 
vital import, which is the "stream of tensions and reso-
lutions" that comprise felt life. The significance of 
significant form is its vital import, and forms in art 
haVE! significance by reason of the congruence between 
the logic of artistic forms and the logic of the forms 
of ~mbjective life. The logic of subjective life is the 
logic of organic process es, which are c haracterized by 
rhyt.hmic continuity. Art presents the semblance of or-
ganic processes by creating an illusion of the dynamic 
func:tional unity in an organism, and this illusion is 
eff E~ cted in and through the organic unity of form in art. 
The primary response of an aesthetic percipient is 
that of conceiving the idea of felt life presented in the 
artistic symbol. A \flOrk of art has an effect that is 
like feelings, but is not the feelings themselves. Sym-
bolical forms in art make feelings conceivable, and are 
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not a means for their stimulation. Emotive stimulation 
in ~esthetic appreciation indicates that the percipient 
has mistaken and confused sign function with symbol 
function, and thus mistaken a pure semblance of life 
for an actual life situation. The import of a work of 
art is not understood through a process of discursive 
construction, but is seen in a single intuitive grasp 
of the significance of the object presented. This in-
tuitive grasp of formal significance is logic al in t he 
mosG basic sense, viz., the simple awareness of formal 
relatedness and congruen ce. 
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Although a work of art does not convey propositional 
truth, it does convey art istic truth, i.e. , the truth of 
its symbolic form to the fo rms of feeling. 
Art, as a formulation, articulation, and symbol-
ization of subjective life, has the important social 
function of raising emotions and feelings to the level 
of intelligence, i.e. , the level of conception. Thus, 
art is educational insofar as it makes the life of feel-
ing amenable to understanding. Finally, the symbolical 
transformation of experience in art helps fulfill man's 
basic heed for an expressive formulation of reality. 
CHAPT r"'R III 
JOHN DE\oJEY' S AES1'HETIC TH EORY 
This chapter presents an analysis of John Deviey' s 
aesthetics. Particular attention is given to Dewey's con-
ception of the nature and· characteristics of aesthetic ex-
perience, of artistic production, and of the art object. 
Some remarks about Dewey's life and his conception of 
philosophy will provide a background for these topics. 
1. Biographical Sketchl 
John Dewey (1859-1952) was born in Burlington, Ver-
mont. He graduated from the University of Vermont in 1879, 
and took his Doctorate from Johns Hopkins University in 1884. 
Dewey held teaching posts at the University of Michigan, 
University of Minnesota, and the University of Chicago. At 
the University of Chicago, he was the head of the Philosophy 
Department and the director of the School of Education. In 
1904 Dewey went to Columbia University, where he finished 
hi s active teaching career in 1930. 
In 1919 Dewey gave a series of lectures at Tokyo 
Imperial University, Japan, and at the National Universities 
1. Most of the information about Dewey's life pre-
sented herein may be found in Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), The 
Philosophy of John Dewey (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1939), "Biography of John Dev1ey," pp. 3-45. This 
volume is hereafter referred to as "Schilpp." 
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of Peking and Nanking, China . In 1937 Dewey served as Chair-
man of the Commission of Inquiry into the charges against 
Leon Trotsky at the Moscow trials. Dewey considered his 
trips abroad as opportunities to further the development of 
his own theory of social action, aside from whatever influ-
ence his views had on other cultures.l 
De\'ley has had and is still having a profound effect 
on American culture. He was active in social and political 
reform movements and, in education, was the founder of the 
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progressive school movement. He 'V'Tas one of the founders and 
the first president of the American Association of University 
Professors. Because of his broad influence on American cul-
ture in many different areas of activity, Dewey has been called 
nthe philosopher of America. n2 The scope of De\...,ey' s interests 
may be seen in his published works in the fields of psychology, 
education, philosophy, political theory, logic, religion, and 
aesthetics .. 
Before an examination of Dewey's aims and purposes in 
aesthetics, it is perhaps well to consider briefly his con-
ception of philosophy, since his aims in aesthetics may be 
better understood in the light of his view of philosophy . 
1. Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
2. G. H. Mead uses this appellation in nThe Philoso-
phies of Royce, James, and Dewey in Their American Setting," 
Walter G. Muelder and Laurence Sears, The Development of 
American Philosophx (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
l940) ) p. 329. 
2. Conception of Philosophy 
Dewey's conception of phil osophy is not easy to deter-
mine, ~~specially because his vie\v of philosophy changed in 
accord with his own intellectual development and experience.l 
Nevertheless, some general and very brief observations on 
Dewey's view of philosophy may be helpful in setting the 
background for exposition of his aesthetic theory. 
From a negative viewpoint, there is in DevTey' s inter-
pretation of philosophy a recurremt and more or less vigorous 
attack on what he considers to be the "contemplative" nature 
of all past philosophy, particularly Greek philosophy.2 By 
"conterr,plativet' Dewey means that philosophy has been concerned 
with passive appreciation of "reality," fixed forms, finali-
ties and ends. It is in this sense that Dewey frequently uses 
the term "esthetic" to describe Greek philosophy.3 
l . Cf. Schilpp, p. 49. For a treatment of Dewey's 
68 
early intellectual development, and his deviation from idealism 
to instrumentalism, cf. Morton G. White, The Origin of Dewey's 
Instrumentalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943). 
2. There are many passages in Dewey's writings which 
might well be termed a lamentation on the passive and con-
templative nature of Greek philosophy and past philosophy in 
general. Cf., e.g. , Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 70-71, 
98-99, 106-107; Experience and Nature, pp. 90, 107-108, 331-
32; The Quest For Certainty, chaps. iii-iv; and also, Logic: 
The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 82-85. Publication data on these 
volumes is contained in the bibliography of this thesis. Un-
less otherwise noted, all further references in this chapter 
will be to the works of John Dewey. 
J. The Quest For Certainty (New York: Minton, Bal ch & 
Company, 1929), p. 90. 
According to Dewey, "Greek philosophy as well as Greek 
art is a memorial of the joy in 'What is finished," and for the 
Greeks, trform was the first and last work of philosophy be-
cause it had been that of art."l Because of this, the Greeks 
tended to reify aesthetic categories into final reality. In 
Dev-1ey' s words, such reality "consists of objects of immediate 
enjoyment hypostasized into transcendent reality. Such was 
the conversion of Greek esthetic contemplation effected by 
Greek reflection."2 The conversion, through identification, 
of immediately enjoyed objects into epistemic objects and 
then into components of reality, is for Dewey a confusion of 
knmvledge with the immediate appreciation and enjoyment of 
aesthetic phenomena. It is this confusion, vvith its con se-
quent social and political effects, which Dewey seeks to 
rectify in his own conception of philosophy. 
The contrast between Dewey's view of philosophy and 
the view he attributes to the Greeks is perhaps best illus-
trated in Reconstruction in Philosophy.3 Here, Dev;ey argues 
that philosophy, if it is to keep pace with progress in the 
physical sciences, must adopt a method similar to the methods 
1. Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications 
Inc., 1958), pp. 90-91. 
2. Ibid., p. 90. 
3. Cf., Schilpp, p. 61. Here, Joseph Ratner holds 
that the concept of philosophy which Dewey sets forth in 
Reconstruction in Philosophy may be considered representative 
of the concept of philosophy in almost all of his subse·quent 
writings. 
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of physical science. 
When the practice of knowledge ceased to be dialecti-
cal and became experimental, knowing became preoccu-
pied with changes and the test of knowledge became the 
ability to bring about certain changes. Knowing, for 
the experimental sciences, means a certain kind of in-
telligently conducted doing; it ceases to be contempla-
tive and becomes in a true sense practical. Now this 
implies that philosophy, unless it is to undergo a 
complete break with the authorized spirit of science, 
must also alter its nature . It must assume a practi-
cal nature; it must become operative and experimental.l 
This change in the nature of philosophy "signifies that the 
prime function of philosophy is that of rationalizing the 
possibilities of experience, especially collective human ex-
perience . "2 Dewey goes on to insist that "rationalizing the 
possibilities of experience" does not mean that philosophers 
should continue polemical exercises about the separate natures 
of the "noumenal" and nphenomenal" worlds, nor about the epis-
temological problem of showing how an independent "subjectrr 
can know an equally independent 'object.n3 
What "rationalizing the possibilities of experience" 
means is that philosophy should be used as a means for deal-
ing with the moral and social conflicts extant in contemporary 
society .4 An operational philosophy would issue in effects as 
1. Reconstruction in Philosophy_ (New York: The New 
American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1950) p. 106. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 107. 
4. Ibi~., ·PP· 45, 107. 
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evident as those of experimental science, for its task would 
be "to clarify men's ideas as to the social and mor al strifes 
of their own day. nl Dewey seems to be saying t\"lO things: 
first, that philosophy should be operational2 and, second , 
that it should have both theoretical (clarification of i dea s) 
and practical (dealing with social conflicts) functions. 
Perhaps the most explicit and well known stateinent of 
Dewey's view of philosophy, and one that is not unrel ated to 
the one just mentioned, is found in the final chapter of 
Experience and Nature. In this chapter, Dewey says t hat 
values .E.§_r se, in their immediate occurrence, are simply had 
and enjoyed; 11 they either are or are not, n and that is all. 3 
However, the attempt to pass beyond values per se implie s 
reflection about them, even in the instance of attempting an 
elementary definition of them. This is what happens whenever 
"enjoyment ceases to be a datum and becomes a problem. "4 
When values do become a nproblem," and the terms of the prob-
lem are reflected upon, what is happening is philosophical 
criticism. Dewey goes on to define philosophy as 11 a criticism 
1. Ibid., p. 45. 
2. An examination of what Dewey means by "operationaln 
and 1'experimental" would require considerably more analysis 
than is within the range of this thesis. For this reason, 
the nature of experimental-operational method in his philos-
ophy is only mentioned here. 
3. Experience and Nature, p. 398. 
4. Ibid. 
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of criticisms,n which is distinguished from all other criti-
cisms by its generality.l 
Dewey believes that never-specialization and division 
of interestsn results in a demand for an organ of communica-
tion between the separated areas of experience and interests, 
and that "philosophy as ••• fl~his7 critical organ becomes 
in effect a messenger, a liaison officer, making reciprocally 
intelligible voices speaking provincial tongues, and thereby 
enlarging as well as rectifying the meanings with which they 
are charged."2 The generality of philosophy as criticism 
does not mean that other criticisms are simply translated 
into philosophical jargon and ideas. The generality of 
philosophical criticism is found, rather, in the nature of 
philosophy as a nfree messenger of communicationn (not an 
"agent of some special and partial interest") with the "task 
of liberating and clarifying meanings.n3 
For the reason that philosophy nhas no stock of in-
formation ••• peculiarly its own," the already existent 
npositive concrete goods of science, art and social com-
panionship are the basic subject-matter of philosophy.n4 
Thus, philosophy does not , or ought not, create de novo "a 
world of 'reality' ••• hidden from science and common-
sense.115 But philosophy does function to nclarify, liberate 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., p. 410. 
3. Ibid., pp . 410-11. 4. Ibid., pp . 407, 412. 
5. Ibid., p . 407. 
72 
and extend the goods which inhere in the naturally generated 
functions of experience.n1 Moreover, in addition to its use 
of the common goods of experience, philosophy is vitally 
related to society as an organ of social reform. 
Social reform is ''the liberation and expansion of the 
meanings of which experience is capable.n2 Philosophy, as 
an organ for "rationalizing the possibiliti~ of experience, n 
is engaged in activity very close to social reform . Philos-
ophy is itself a theoretical and practical criticism arising 
out of social processes as well as influencing those pro-
cesses. J. H. Randall,) in pointing out the nature of this 
reciprocal relation between philosophy and social processes , 
maintains that for Dewey, 
philosophic problems arise .whenever the strife of 
ideas and experience forces men back to fundamental 
assumptions in any field; they are to be understood 
only as expressions of the basic conflicts within a 
culture that drive men to thoroughgoing criticism. 
Philosophy is the expression in thought of the pro-
cess of cultural change itself; it is the intellectual 
phase of the process by which conflicts within a ci v-
ilization are resolved and composed.4 
Remembering that "when enjoyment. ceases to be a datum and 
becomes a problem" philosophical criticism arises , it is 
clear that for Dewey philosophy is inherently tied up with 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 411. 
). Randall was both a student and colleague of Dewey's , 
and he has Dewey's full approval for his interpretation here. 
4. Schilpp, p. 86. 
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values as an organ of culture for their reconstruction and 
clarification. 
To su~~arize what has been said here: Philosophy, 
for D~wey, is not of the nature of the "esthetic" insofar 
as the term "esthetic" designates relatively passive contem-
plation of fixed objects and values . Philosophy is an ex-
perimental inquiry into the possibilities of experience with 
an aim to the clarification of the meanings of social and 
moral conflicts; it is further a criticism of all criticisms, 
with a generality greater than any particular criticism 
insofar as the latter tend to arise from partial interests. 
The subject-matter for philosophical criticism is comprised 
in the natural goods of experience, including those of sci-
ence, art, and social process . Philosophy occurs in a cul-
tural matrix and is in turn a mE~ans for the expansion and 
reorganization of the values found in a culture. 
JYhel effort to make our dE~sires, our strivings and 
our ideals, (which are as natural to man as his aches 
and his clothes) articulate, to define them (not in 
themselves which is impossible) in terms of inquiry 
into conditions and consequences is what I have called 
criticism; ynd when carried on in the grand manner, 
philosophy . 
3. Aims in Aesthetics 
Considered generally, much of the philosophy of John 
Dewey may well be understood as an attempt to relate and 
recombine all of the manifold factors in human experience 
1. Experience and Nature, p. 418. 
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which Dewey believes have been artificially dichotomized by 
previous philosophers. 1 Dewey's aims in aesthetics exhibit 
his characteristic opposition to the dichotomization of ex -
per~ence no less than do his other phil osophical inquiries . 
Accordingly, in aesthetics Dewey aims to develop a 
theory of art in which art objects are not accounted for as 
separat e entities, detached from the rest of experience ; his 
purpos e is to restore aesthetic experience, which i s often 
held to be a special, "higher" mode of experiencing , to its 
connections with everyday experience, which in its turn is 
often held to be a "lowern form of activity. Dewey says that 
his aesthetic theory is design ed to relate art to the rest of 
life, with which it is, he believes, organically connected. 
When artistic objects are separated from both condi-
tions of origin and operation in experience, a wall 
is built around them that renders almost opaque their 
general si gnificance, with itlhich esthetic theory deals. 
Art is remitted to a separate realm, where it is cut 
off from that association with the materials and aims 
of every other form of human effort, undergoing , and 
achievement. A primary task is thus imposed upon one 
who undertakes to write upon the philosophy of the 
fine arts. This task is to restore continuity between 
the refined and intensified forms of experience that 
are· works of art and the everyday events, doings, and 
sufferings that are universally recognized to constitute 
l. The Quest For Certainty, pp. 32,51, 58, ~passim. 
In connection with Dewey ' s attempt to resolve the traditional 
dualisms in philosophy, and his polemics against all varie-
ties of dualism, Morton White writes: "I cannot stress too 
heavily the importance of the concept of dualism in Dewey's 
development. No position, large or small, that Dewey attacked 
was not charged at some point or other with being dualistic. 
This charge was deemed sufficient to destroy any philosophical 
claim . " Cf . Morton White, The Origin of Dewey's Instrumental -
ism, p. 150 . 
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expe ri en c e .l 
Dewey makes it clear, furthermore, that while positively 
developing an aesthetic aimed at establishing the continuity 
of art .with the rest of life and experience, he is also try-
ing to show how isolationist theories of art are inadequate 
insofar as they cannot be founded on the nature of art itself. 
My purpose ••• is to indicate that theories which 
isolat e art and its appreciation by placing them in 
a realm of their own, disconnected from other modes 
of experiencing, are not inherent in the subject mat-
ter but arise because of specifiable extraneous con-
ditions.2 
De\..rey aims, then, to formulate a eontextualist interpretation 
of art, i.e., one in which art is seen within the context of 
experience and society. By doing this he also proposes to 
negate the basic considerations from v1hich isolationist the-
ories proceed. The examination here of how Dewey works out 
his purposes begins with attention to what he conceives to 
be the nature of aesthetic experience. 
4. Aesthetic Experience 
Dewey believes that an explanation of art must begin 
with experience, indeed, with expE:!rience in its most rudi-
mentary forms. The starting point for aesthetics is by way 
of "a detour, by going back to experience of the common or 
mill run of things to discover the esthetic quality such 
1 . Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch &. Com-
pany, 1934), p. 3. 
2. Ibid., p. 10. 
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experience possesses. 111 DevTey' s use of the word "detour" 
indicates his insistence on going back first to the experi-
ential context in which works of art and aesthetic experience 
are generated. Before any analysis of the finished work of 
art, Dewey wishes to find "how the vmrk of art develops and 
accentuates what is char~cterist:ically valuable in things of 
everyday enjoyment," as well as how "these works idealize 
qualiti es found in common experience.n2 What, then, is the 
nature and relation of aesthetic elements in experience to 
ordinary, everyday experience? 
i. Aesthetic Element s in Experience 
Dev1ey begins by saying that man, although different 
from an animal, undergoes many of the same basic life pro-
cesses as an animal does. Both men and animals live in an 
environment with which they are in continual interaction .3 
This basic fact is what involves all organisms in a struggle 
to attain a stable relationship with their environment. The 
tendency and struggle of organisms to achieve this stability 
is what constitutes "normal experience."4 
This struggle for stability with environment takes 
the dynamic form of patterns of stability followed by. patterns 
of instability, of balance and imbalance. After conflict and 
instabi~ity with its environment, an organism may regain a 
1. Ibid., p. 11. 
3. Ibid., p. 13. 
2. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 14. 
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new· balanced relation to its environment. "This balanced re-
lation is "new" because it is attained literally "in the 
light ofn prior conflict with the environment. 
Life itself consists of phases in which the organism 
falls out of step with the march of surrounding things 
and then recovers unison with it •••• And, in a grow-
ing life, the recovery is never mere return to a prior 
state, for it is enriched by· the state of disparity 
and resistance through which it has successfully 
passed.l 
Organisms develop and grow, then, when a conflict or resist-
ance between organism and environment carries the organism 
through a transition which is a t;ransformation to "a more 
extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those 
of the conditions under which it lives.n2 The overcoming of 
opposition and conflict is not mere passive accommodation to 
environmental opposition, but instead is an active transfor-
mation of the organic-envtronmental energies which issue in 
rra higher powered and more significant life. n3 Dewey adds 
that if such a transformation does not occur, the organism 
nmerely subsists," whereas if the gap, or instability, between 
organism and environment is too great, the organism dies.4 
Normal experience, as seen in the preceding analysis, 
is the vital, dynamic, struggle of organisms for the contin-
ual renewal and expansion of life in and through novel trans-
formations of the resistances and tensions that are generated 
in the natural environment. Thus, nhere .[fn normal experienc~ 
1. Ibid., p. 14. 2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 
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in germ are balance and harmony attained through rhythm. 
Equilibrium comes about not mechanically and inertly but out 
of, and because of, tension.rrl The very nature of normal ex-
perience, even at this level of analysis, exhibits the aes-
thetic qualities of rhythm, balance, harmony, and equilibrium. 
Although these elements are rudimentary in normal ex-
perience, the nature of normal experience does manifest a form 
that is not unlike the form in art. In experience, rTforrn is 
arrived at whenever a stable, even though moving, equilibrium 
is reached. Changes interlock and sustain one another .••• 
Order is not imposed from without but is made out of the re-
lations of harmonious interactions that en~rgies bear to one 
ar~other. rr2 When an organism participates in stability with 
its environment, nit bears within itself the germs of a con-
suJnmati on akin to the esthetic. rr3 Such a consummation is 
"akin" to the aesthetic because it is the dynamic resolution 
and culmination of vital life processes, of TTbreaks and re-
unions" with the environment. Without prior conflict and 
rhythmic movement, the consummations in experience would not 
be consummations4 for Dewey--nor would they bear a likeness 
to esthetic perception. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 15. 
4. Cf. below, PP • 108-109 
tinctly aesthetic consummation. 
for the nature of dis-
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Because of the aesthetic characteristics in normal ex-
perience, art is related positive!ly to normal experience. 
Dev1ey contends, furthermore, that if experience is indeed 
experience, it is of the nature of the dynamic movement and 
growth he has called "normal expE!rience. n Much of what is 
called experience is not, of course, of the type Dewey has 
outlined. It is rather only a mode of subsisting, mechanical 
routine, or capricious indulgencel, or even a sort of dying. 
As will be pointed out shortly, t~his type of " experiencen is 
1"lhat Del.'>ley terms the "non-aesthet~ic." It stands in sharp 
contrast with what he means by experience. In swnmary, his 
own words may point out the contrast: 
Experience in the degree in which it is experience 
is heightened vitality. Instead of signifying being 
shut up within one's own private feelings and sensa-
tions, it signifies active and alert commerce with the 
world; at its height it signifies complete interpene-
tration of self and the world of objects and events. 
Instead of signifying surrender to caprice and dis-
order, it affords our sole demonstration of a stability 
that is not stagnation but is rhythmic and developing. 
Because experience is the fulfillment of an organism 
in its struggles and achiev~nents in a world of things, 
it is art in germ. Even in its rudimentary fo1~s, it 
contains the promise of that delightful perception 
which is esthetic experience.l 
What is the nature of the "perception which is esthetic 
experience"? Ordinary experience, even though exhibiting 
aesthetic elements in germ, is not aesthetic experience . The 
basic charact eristics of aesthetic experience may be found in 
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Dewey's concept of ..§£ experience , This cone ept is nmv examined . 
1 . Art as Experience, p. 19. 
ii. An Experience 
The relationship and continuity of normal experience 
to aesthetic experience is clarified in Dewey's explanation 
of what happens when we have §E. ElXperience. Even though the 
natur e of §E. experience is not the sam.e as an aesthetic ex-
' perience, the characteristics of an experience are precondi-
tions which must be found in any experience that is uniquely 
aesthetic. 
Dewey says that "we have .§Ql experience when the mate-
rial experienced runs its course to fulfillment,u when, after 
a g enuine beginning there is successive movement , without 
"unfilled blanks,n or "holes," through to a consummation.l 
As contrasted with experience which begins, ceases, and then 
b egins again, §E. experience has a temporal unity insofar as 
it i s a successive movemen t in time, a movement nfrom some-
thing to something.n2 
For example, in an experiemce of eating a full course 
meal there might be a definite beginning with an aperitif, 
and a successive movement through the hors-d' oeuvre, entree , 
piece de resistance, and dessert, to fulfillment in t he 
digest if. We might speak later of such a meal as that meal. 3 
It was an experience of eating. There may be pauses in such 
an experience, but they are not stops in the sense t hat a new 
1. Ibid., pp. 35-37. 2. Ibid., p. 36. 
3. Ibid . 
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commencement follows them. Such pauses are rather punctua-
tions, nto define the quality of movement" of the experience .l 
Thus, in the example above, any rest or pause bet,veen courses 
(or even bites) of the meal defines the quality of the move-
ment into the next course. 
Each part of the meal is distinct in itself. But the 
whole meal is not the sum of all its parts. Rather, the meal 
is an integral experience in which each part is a variation on 
the quality of the whole experi ence . 2 The quality of the 
whole experience constitutes a qualitative unity by virtue of 
which it is .§11 experience. nAn experience has a unity that 
gives it its name •••• The existence of this unity is consti-
tuted by a single quality that pervades t he entire experience 
in spite of the variation of its constituent parts."3 Dewey's 
point here may be illustrated by· use of the example already 
cited. Each part of the meal is a different type of emphasis 
of the pervading quality of the whole meal. The hers -d'oeuvre, 
for example, is a particular instance of the pervading quality 
of the whole meal. An experience, then, is comprised of a 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. Cf. also Dewey's definition of a "situation" 
in, Logic; """"Tii'e Theorb of Inquiry ( Nevl York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1938), p. 6 . Similar to.§!!. experience, a situa-
tion is defined as a rtcontextual whole. '' The parts , i.e., 
the objects or events , in .§:.!! experience or a "situation 11 have 
no existence in isolation, but only within the context of the 
total experience. 
3. Art as Experi ence, p. 37. 
qualitative unity of interrelated elements all of 1~hich 
contribute to the n enduring vfhol'~. n 
The unity of an experience is neither emotional, 
practical, nor intellectual. Th1:!se are distinctions that 
reflection can make about the experience after it is over, 
but during the experience these distinctions 11were lost in 
it as distinctive traits . "l Experience that is dominantly 
aesthetic is unique because it is had for its own sake as 
qualitative appreciation, its materials are qualities. Ex-
perience having intellectual ends, however, deals with signs 
or symbols \'li thout intrinsic quality in themselves. 2 Aes-
thetic experience is also distinguished from emotional ex-
perience, which as such, is mere spouting forth. Apart from 
integration in an enduring situation involving objects, emo-
tions are hardly more than "autornati c reflexes. "3 
Any experience, however, be it intellectual, emotional, 
or practical, must have the aesthetic quality of .§!!. experi-
ence if it is to have a unity. I~or this reason Dev-1ey does 
not set up sharp divisions between the intellectual, prac-
tical, emotional, and aesthetic factors in experience. 
It is not possible to dividE~ in a vital experience 
{i.e . , in~ experience? the practical, emotional 
and intellectual from one another and to set the 
properties of one over against the characteristics 
of the others. The emotional phase binds parts to-
gether into a single whole; "intellectual 11 simply 
names the fact that the experience has meaning; 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., p. 38 . 3. Ibid., p. 42. 
npractical" indicates that the organism is inter-
acting vr.i.th events and objeets which surround it.l 
A scientific, political, philosophical, or industrial enter-
prise, in fact any human enterprise, has, when its "different 
ingredients constitute an integral experience, esthetic 
quality."2 
Since any experience, if it is an experience, has 
aesthetic quality, the precise opposite of aesthetic experi-
ence is not practical, intellectual, or emotional experience. 
"The enemies of the estheticn ar'~ r ather "the humdrum; slack-
ness of loose ends; submission to convention in practice and 
intellectual procedure. Rigid abstinence, coerced submission, 
tightness on one side and dissipation, incoherence and aim-
less indulgence on the other," which are TTdeviations in oppo-
site directions from the unity of an experience.n3 Dewey 
explains that the non-aesthetic lies vJi thin two poles. On 
the one side there is experience beginning and ending at no 
particular place, things merely happen, and 1tre drift in a sea 
of disorganized circumstance. On the other side there is ex-
perience dictated by external pressure, events are mechani-
cally connected and externally related, so that the experience 
has no dynamic organization leading to a genuine conclusion.4 
At both poles experience lacks unity and the vital integration 
of energies that constitute an experience. However, between 
1. Ibid. , p. 55. 
3 • Ibid • , p • 40 • 
2. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
the extremes of aiml e ss drifting and mechanical efficiency 
there lie those modes of experiencing in which there is a 
genuine inception followed by successive movement through 
which TTthere runs a sense of grm-ving meaning conserved and 
a ccumulating toward an end that is felt as accomplishment of 
a process .n1 
Experience involving many different materials and 1rith 
many varying purposes and interests may be the complete ex-
perience that is ..§!!. experience. Nevertheless, such experi-
ence will not be pre-eminently aesthetic insofar as its end 
leaves a definite instrument for further use, e.g., a moral 
norm, an intellectual or scientific 11 truth, n or an industrial 
plant.2 In contrast, an experience that is distinctively 
aesthetic has a "close" that is significant "not by itself 
but as the integration of the partsn in the experience.3 An 
aesthetic terminus "has no other existence" than this fin'al 
integration of parts in the experience. 
That which distinguishes an experience as esthetic 
is conversion of resistance and tensions, of exci-
tations that in themselves are temptations to diver-
sion, into a movement toward an inclusive and 
fulfilling close .4 
The nclose" is fulfilling because it is felt as the naccomp-
lishment of a process," i.e., of integrating the parts of the 
experience. Thus, the fulfillment of the experience is had 
1. Ibid., p. 39. 
3. Ibid. 
~ 
.\ 
2. Ibid., p. 55. 
4. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
in the close itself, intrinsically, not specifically because 
it leaves a ndeposit" for further use . l 
Although the characteristics of an experience are 
found in, indeed are preconditions for an aesthetic experi-
ence, they alone do not constitute it . An experience is 
aesthetic when the characteristies that make it an experience 
are had for their own sake, not for ulterior uses. 
An object is peculiarly and dominantly esthetic, 
yielding the enjoyment characteristic of esthetic 
perception, when the factors that determine any-
thing which can be called an experience are lifted 
high above the threshold of-perception and are made 
manifest for their own sake.2 
The aesthetic characterist ics of an experience, i.e., 
"the factors that determine anything which can be called an 
experience," now need to be explicitly stated and defined . 
Wit h this aim in view, the follo11ling two sections deal with 
Dev1ey' s view of the place of undergoing and doing, and of 
emotion, in aesthetic experience. 
i ii . Undergoing and Doing 
Looking at art from the perspective of the aesthetic 
percipient, Dewey holds that appreciation of the art object 
is the receptive 1'or undergoing phase of experience , n in which 
more or less complete attention is given over to the object.3 
1. Ibid., p. 55. On the instrumental character of 
the terminus of a work of art, cf. belo\'l, p. 109. 
3. Art as Experience, p. 53. 
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However, reception of the object is not passive, but is an 
active re-creation of the artistic object.l It is in and 
through this act of re-creation that the artistic object 
becomes aesthetic object for the percipient. Thus, Dewey 
explains that the undergoing phase of experience involves 
surrender insof2,r a s the self must yield to the object, but 
that nwe must surrunon energy and pitch it at a responsive key 
in order to take in" the object. 2 For this reason, aesthetic 
appreciation requires both "surrender" to the object and 
"heightened activity" in order to appreciate it.3 
The summoning of energy, and/or the heightening of 
activity in order to "take in 1' the object is a "controlled 
activity that may well be intense."4 What Dewey means by 
"controlled activity" is in a sense the key to his entire 
conception of the aesthetic. It is fitting to examine next 
what is meant by control, as it is operative in aesthetic 
perception. 
Dewey believes that the term aesthetic "refers • • • 
to experience as appreciative, perceiving, and enjoying.n5 
1. Ibid., p. 54. 
2. Ibid., p. 53. 
3. It is in t his sense that Dewey agrees with 
Miss Puffer that "'repose in stimulation' characterizes art." 
Cf. Experience and Nature, p. 359. 
4. Art as Experience, p . 53. 
5. Ibid., pp . 46-47. 
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'rhe term ''art denotes a process of doing or making. nl He 
laments the separation of doing and undergoing which the 
terms "artistic" and "aesthetic" often seem to establish.2 
"lrlhile it is true that there are important distinctions to 
be made between doing and undergoing~ Dewey insists never-
theless that, "the relation that exists in having an experi-
ence between doing and undergoing indicate that the distinction 
bet~'leen esthetic and artistic cannot be pressed so far as to 
become a separation.'' ) 
The activities denoted by the two terms cannot -be 
separated because they are organically related in percep-
tion.4 Considered from the standpoint of aesthetic percep-
tion, 5 Del'ley points out that re --creation of the object 
incorporates activity not unlike the activity of artistic 
production. In creating the object the artist not only per-
ceives his mvn work-in-creation, but also does something to 
objective materials in order to !:!reate the work. In re-
creating the object the appreciator organizes it from his 
perspective and interests, and g<:>es through a selection of 
1. Ibid . 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 47 . 
4. Ibid., p. 49. 
5. Cf. below, pp. lOl-1 04, J'or an examination from the 
perspective of artistic production . 
the elements of the work, and abstraction of its signifi-
cance, in a way not unlike that done in artistic creation.l 
Re-creation of the object is for this reason controlled by 
intelligent organization on the part of the appreciator. 
Moreover, appreciation nel~ds to be informed by a 
knowledge of the artistic activity of which it is the con -
sequence, at least insofar as th1a production of works of art 
i s aimed at their enjoyment in alesthetic perception. Dewey 
maintains that there must be an awareness in perception that 
the art object has been intentionally f ramed for apprecia-
t ion, for otherwise perception cannot be aesthetic. This 
poi~t is graphically illustrated: 
Suppose ••• that a finely wrought object, one 
whose texture and proportio :~s are highly pleasing 
in perception, has been believed to - be a product 
of some primitive people. 1rhen there is discovered 
evidence that proved it to be an accidental natural 
product. As an external thing, it is novl precisely 
what it was before. Yet at once it ceases to be a 
work of art and becomes a natural ncuriosity .• " It 
now belongs in a museum of :natural history, not in 
a museum of art . 2 
The significance of this illustration is not that of logical 
classification , but that in fact thet~ is created a differ -
ence in appreciative perception once it is di scovered that 
an object is not a product of art but is instead a natural 
object. Aesthetic perception is, as a result, unique for 
the reason that it includes not only appreciation of an 
1 . Art as ExEerience, p. 54. 
2. Ibid., p. 48 . 
object gua object, but of an object and its manner of crea-
tion as created for perceptual e:1.joyment. Dewey concludes 
that, "the esthetic experience • • • is thus seen to be in-
herently connected with the experience of making,nl i.e., 
with the experience that is'artistic creation. Aesthetic 
experience is controlled, then, by perception of the recip-
rocal relation of perception and production, as well as by 
the use of intelligence in re-creation of the object. Sen-
sory satisfaction, "seeing, hearing, tasting, become esthetl. c 
vrhen relation to a distinct mann.er of activity qualifies what 
is perceived. n 2 
Aesthetic experience, as the undergoing, receptive 
phase of experience, is not exhausted in ''surrender" of the 
self, but includes an active doing wherein there is an out-
going of energy in the re-creation of the object, as well as 
controlled perception of the object as artistic pro duct for 
aesthetic appreciation. It is in this sense that aesthetic 
experience is a ncontrolled activity." Aesthetic experience 
i s a unity in perception of doing and undergoing , in which 
t he t'\'I!O are reciprocally and organically related. Undergoing 
alone, without perception of its relationship to the activity 
that has generated it, is non-aesthetic. But in aesthetic 
experience: 
1. Ibid., p. 49. 
2. Ibid. 
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Because of the relation bet¥reen what is done and 
what is undergone, there is an immediate sense of 
things in perception as belonging together or as 
jarring; as reenforcing or as interfering •••. 
Insofar as the development of an experience is 
controlled through reference to these immediately 
felt relations of order and fulfillment, that ey-
perience becomes dominantly e~thetic in nature. 
Since aesthetic experiencE~ is not something that 
"happens" to someone, but is rather something that takes 
energy to institute, Dewey is opposed to any theory of art 
"tvhich locates aesthetic experience in a separate activity 
of 1'mind, n whether the . activity is described as. 11 contempla-
tive , n "disinterested," ndetached,n or ndistanced.n2 An 
analysis of the place of emotion in aesthetic experience 
will help to shov; why Dewey is opposed to use of these terms, 
a s well as help to clarify the psychological context in whi ch 
he locates a esthetic experience. 
i v. Emotion 
Emotion is a very important ingredient in the under-
going of an aesthetic experience. But emotions in art are 
not separate, independent nthingsn experienced by either 
artist or appreciator. Dewey is very insistent that the 
significant content of art is not, a peculiar emotion, and is 
not a stimulus for arousing emotions, at least not in the 
sense that emotions are substant:ial nthings . n3 Emotion, 
1. Ibid., p. 50. 
2. Ibid., pp. 256-58. 
3. Experience and Nature, p. 390. 
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v.rhen it signifies independent emotions, simply means "spev-1-
ing forth, n and amounts to little more than instantaneous 
expulsion of energy.l 
Emotions that are aesthetic, however, are controlled 
because they carry emotional meanings from past experience 
with them, and past materials augment aesthetic signific ance 
of present experience.2 Furthermore, for the reason that 
any present aesthetic experiencE~ is 1 through re-creation and 
perception, related to an art object, emotions are " tied" to 
the object.3 "Emotion is aesthE~tic when it adheres to an 
object formed by an expressive act."4 Aesthetic emotion is 
not, therefore, formed of pre-existing sentiments, but is 
"an emotion induced by material that is expressive . '1 Ori-
ginal impulses to emotional diseharge are transformed in 
aesthetic experience through th1~ir evocation by an object 
t hat has been created f or their clarification. 5 The aesthe-
tic object, a s product of the reciprocal activi ty of under-
going and doing , is the agency in an d through which natural 
emotions are transformed into aesthetic emotions.6 Thus, 
1. Art as Experience, p . 42. 
2. Ibid., p. 122. 
3. Experience and Nature, p. 390. 
4. Art a s Experience, p. 76. For the nature of "an 
expressive act," cf. below, pp. 96-101. 
5. Art as Experience, p . 77. 
6. Ibid. 
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aesthetic emotion is experienced as objectified and fulfilled 
in the aesthetic object, since the emotion exists only in 
relation to the re-creative organization of the object. 
Aside from the fact that aesthetic emotion is related 
to objective materials, it has the important function in 
aesthetic experience of unifying in re-creation the "pene-
trating quality that runs through all the parts of the work 
of art.nl The unifying or fusion of this quality "is the 
felt presence of the same qualitative unity" in all of the 
parts of the work.2 Dev.rey insists that this "felt presence" 
is unnameable; it is simply had and enjoyed as such . It is 
the qualita tive unity of a work of art that accounts for the 
particular nspirit" and "reality" of the work, it is what 
11enlivens and animates" it, and it can only be 11 emotionally 
intuit ed • "3 
The nature of emotional intuition, lllfhile it is not in-
dulgence in mere discharge of energy, is neither characterized 
1. Ibid., p. 192. 
2. Ibid., pp . 192-93. 
93 
3. Ibid., p. 266. In this context, Dev.rey apparently 
means by 11 intuitionn a sudden, harmonious Hflash of revela-
tion, 11 which seems instantaneous, but has in fact been pre-
pared by past experience and is realized by a fusion of past 
experience with the present experience. In Dewey's termin-
ology, when 11 the background of organized meanings !which? can 
alone convert the new situation from the obscure into the clear 
and luminous, {an£7 when old and new jump together, like sparks 
when the poles are adjusted, there is intuition. 11 Art as Ex-
perience, p. 266. 
as a disinterested, detached appreciation of the object. 
Dewey argues that the :Ldeas of ''psychical distance, 11 11 contem-
plation," and lfdisinterestedness,n are more applicable to "raw 
primitive desire and inpulsen than to the aesthetic organiza-
-tion of an experience.l These conceptions are irrelevant t o 
aesthetic experience f or the reason that they are only nega-
tive names for "somethi ng extremely positive,"2 i.e., the 
"heightened acti vi tyn 1~hat is an aesthetic experience. 
The emotional intuition of the qualitative unity in 
a work of art is a heightened activity that makes life more 
i ntelligible by presenting nmeanings as the matter of a 
clarified, coherent, and intensified or 'impassioned' ex-
perience."3 Far from alienating the self from environment, 
such experience engage:3 personality in the full participa-
tion of an experience, in which need, desire, affection, and 
action (doing) are emo1~ionally toned in an intuition of 
qualitative unity. 4. A~~stheti c emotion is significant because 
it is "impassionedn in and through the controlling act of re-
cr eation. It is in vi J~tue of control that emotion can be an 
impassioned cla.rificat :Lon and concentration of meanings, not 
mere discharge of feelings .. 
DeV'Jey' s treatment of the place of emotion in aesthetic 
experience is charactffi·istic of his treatmen t of other 
1 .. Art as Exper:L ence, p. 258. 
3. Ibid., p. 290 . 
2. Ibid., p. 259. 
4. Ibid., pp . 256-57 . 
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perceptual elements in experience. This can be seen, for 
example, v.rhen he says that, 11perception that occurs for its 
own sake is full realization of all the elements of our 
psychological being,nl and that 11 all the elements of our 
being that are display·ed in special emphases and partial 
realizations in other experiences are merged in esthetic 
experience . 11 2 Thus, thought, desire, action, purpose, and 
sense are all involved in aesthetic experience . There is 
not an exclusive aesthetic perceptio'n in art, as if all other 
modes of perception are "cut outu of experience until there 
is nothing left but a peculiar aesthetic perception.3 There 
is, of course, a peculiar aesthetic mode of perception for 
Dewey, but it is achieved not by exclusion but by inclusion 
of all the aspects of the self. An inclusion of all these 
aspects in an experience that is controlled, through the 
reciprocal relation of undergoing and doing, is characteris-
t ic of aesthetic expe1•ience. 
In much of the foregoing what has been said about 
aesthetic experience has frequently contained certain suppo-
sitions about the nature of the art object and its production , 
v-.rhich have not been explicitly explained, e.g., that the na-
ture of artistic crea1~ion is similar to aesthetic re-creation, 
l . Ibid., p. 2:56. 2. Ibid., p. 274. 
3. Ibid., pp. 252-53. 
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and that the artistic object embodies characteristics not 
unlike those favorable to the having of an aesthetic experi-
ence. These presuppositions remain to be explained. They 
are now examined in tt.e following section on artistic pro-
duction and the art object. It may be noted that just as 
the examination of aee.thetic experience suggested a concom-
i tant theory of artistic creation, so it is also seen in the 
following analysis of artistic creation that there is refer-
ence back to the nature of aesthetic experience. 
5. Artistic Production and the Art Object 
The leading co r. siderations for this section are the 
nature and characteri::1tics of artistic creation and of the 
object created. Atter..tion is given first to the former con-
sideration by analyse ::: of the place of expression and control 
in artistic creation, and of the integration of creation and 
perception in artistic: production. The characteristics of the 
art obje c·t are then examined in an analysis of artistic form. 
To begin, then, a return may be made to the problem of emo-
tion and feeling in art, except that here the problem is 
viewed from the perspE!Cti ve of the production of art. 
i. Expression and Control 
Expression in t:trtistic creation is similar to emotion 
in aesthetic experienee insofar as it is not a direct expul-
sion of energy. Dewey points out that every experience be-
gins as an impulsion, and that impulsions are needs of the 
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organism that can only be realized by an interact i on, i.e., 
"by instituting definite relationsn with an objective situ-
ation.l If the organism gives way to natural, spontaneous , 
unintended discharge of impulsion, the result is l i t tle mor e 
t han t hat achieved by the instinctive crying and sneezing of 
an infant. The reason for this is that direct discharge r e-
quires no medium for its expression in the sense t hat media 
are conceived as means to a desired end. But when media are 
conceived as means, t h e ensuing expression is capabl e of 
artistic formulation. nAn activity that was 'natural' • . . 
i s t r ansformed because it is undertaken as a means to a con-
s ciously entertained consequence. Such tra11sformat ion marks 
every deed of art.n2 
De-v1ey goes on to say that "it takes environing and 
resisting objects as ~~11 as internal emotion and impulsion 
t o constitute an expre!ssion of emotion. n3 An expression of 
emoti on is never complete unto itself, but is always about, 
or to, or from an obj ective situation. The objective situa-
tion has the important function of providing the needed 
r esistance to ba sic impulsions so that the meeting of impul -
s ion and environing conditions becomes an occasion for the 
expressive use of basi c impulsion towards expression. nThe 
· thing expressed is wrung from the producer by the pressure 
1. Ibi d., p. 5E: . 2. Ibid., p. 62. 
_;. . Ibid., p. 64. 
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exercised by objective things upon the natural impulses and 
tendencies--so far is expression from being the direct and 
immaculate issue of the latter . nl 
The act of expression in art is controlled, then, by 
at least two factors; the intelligent use of media as mean s 
f or a desired result,2 and the fact that expression, to be 
artistic, must arise vdt!1 in the context of an environing 
situation . Artistic expression is further controlled by 
its temporal nature; it does not happen instantaneously, but 
over a period of time , and time here refers not alone to the 
interval between the inception of a work and its completion, 
but as well to the entire life experience of the artist and 
the relation of this experienc e to his work. Time in the 
sense of !!interval, 11 however, means that, 
the expression of the self in and through a medium, 
constituting the work of art, is itself a prolonged 
interaction of something issuing from the self with 
objective conditions, a process in which both of 
them acquire a form and order they did not at first 
possess.3 
The energy issuing from the self through interaction 
with objective conditions does not end, however, in a com-
pletely novel nform and order they did not at first possess,n 
1. Ibid. , p. 65. 
2. Media are not only means of expression, but in art 
are ends as well, for, as De\vey says ; "The moment we say 
'media' vle refer to means that are incorporated in the out-
come;n e. g ., nbricks and mortar become a part of the house 
they are employed to build. 11 Art as Exp~:r:_ience, pp . 195-98 . 
3. Art as Exoerience, p. 65. 
as if the work of art is produced ex-nihilo . The "entire 
life experience" oY t he artist is involved in the creative 
11 proc es s." 
The life experience of the artist is a controlling 
factor in expression through the influence of his "store 
of attitudes and meanings derived from prior experience.l 
In this sense, operation of past experience precludes totally 
novel and independent expression in the present. 
No matter how areently the artist might desire it, 
he cannot divest himself, in his new perception, of 
meanings funded from his past intercourse with his 
surroundings, nor can he free himself from the in-
fluence they exert upon the substance and manner of 
his present seeir.g.2 
The life of the artist is therefore very positively related 
to his work, for the c.rtist must perceive his present subject 
matter in terms of influences from past meanings , What is 
expressed, then, is nE!i ther the past events that have influ-
enced the present, nor the present occasion as such, but is 
the present as seen in the light of the past.3 
It is precisely the present situation as seen in t he 
perspective of the paE.t that accounts for the individuality 
of the work of art reE.ulting from the creative process. 
Dev;ey says that excitement about present subject matter stirs 
up the meanings from the past, and that "as they are aroused 
into activity they become conscious thoughts and emotions, 
l. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 71 . 
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emotionalized images," which account for artistic inspira-
tion . l But this inspiration per se is insignificant unless 
it is embodied in an artistic medium, color, sound, or what-
ever it may be. It is in and through some objective medium 
that the inspiration is carried to an end. 2 Inspiration 
that is the fuel for artistic expression becomes expressive 
in some medium because it individualizes and defines the 
character of the qualitative materials with which the artist 
is working.3 
Artistic inspiration, since it is generated in the 
junction of the past with the present, is expressed in the 
\vork of art imaginatively, i.e., it is "embodied in a material 
which thereby becomes the medium for" the expression of 
rrmeanings and values that are wider and deeper than the par-
t icular here and nov.r in which they are anchored. n4 Such 
meanings are realized by expressions, and not in an object 
that has causal relations in the physical worlct.5 A canvas, 
a building, or a book, is in the physical environment. But 
the work of art embodied in it is imaginatively expressed, 
and its expression is not physically efficacious. 
In this examination of expression and control, it has 
been pointed out that expression is regulated by three fac-
tors: first, by the resistance of environing conditions to 
1. Ibid., pp . 65-66. 2. Ibid., p. 66. 
3. Ibid., pp. 21)2-204. 4. Ibid., p. 273 . 
5· Ibid. 
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raw impulsions; second, by the intelli gent use of s ensuous 
media for t he articulation of expression, and , third, by 
the funded meanings of past experience which influence the 
contemporary act of expression. While this examination 
accounts for th e natm~ e of artistic expression, it does not 
deal fully with the nature of artistic production as such, 
which is no w examined. 
i i. The Integration of Creation and Perception 
The work of th e artist in creating is not unlike the 
nature of aesthetic perception. Dewey argues that for a 
work t o be artistic it must also be aesthetic, i.e., created 
with an aim to its ade~uacy for perceptual enjoyment.l In-
deed , the artist is not only aware that his work is for per-
ceptual enjoyment, but the process of producing t he work is 
controll ed at every deYelopment by the artist's own aesthetic 
perception of it in cr eative process. 
The process of aF~ in production is related to the 
esthetic in perception organically .•.• Until the 
artist is satisfh~d in perception with what he is 
doing, he continu ·~S shaping and reshaping . The 
making comes to an end when its r ·esult is experi-
enced as good--and that exp erience comes not by mere 
intellectual and outside judgment but in direct per-
ception. An arti:3t • . • is one who is not only es -
pecially gifted in powers of execution but unusual 
sensitivity to thr~ qualities of things. This sensi-
tivity also direct,s his doing s and makings .2 
Thus, although t he artistic phase of experience involves an 
active doing an d making in the execution of the work, it also 
1 • Ibid • , p • 48 . 2. Ibid., p . 49. 
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involves the aesthetic, or undergoing phase of experience. 
In artistic production, as in aesthetic experience, 
the relation between doing and undergoing is reciprocal and 
organic . A painter, for example, not only "does" a painting 
but "undergoes" it as well. 1' A painter must consciously 
undergo the effect of his every brush stroke or he will not 
be aware of what he is doing and i•There his work is going in 
relation to the whole he desires to produce."l To nundergo 
the effect of his every brush stroke" means nothing less 
than that, "the doing or making is artistic ••• [because? 
the perceived result is of such a nature that its qualities 
as perceived have controlled the question of production."2 
The instrument .for the completion of a work is not, 
then, some preconceived plan. The artist ncares about the 
end-result as a completion of what goes before and not be-
cause of its conformity with a ready-made antecedent scheme. "3 
The instrumentality through which production is controlled is 
f or this reason the reciprocal relation of do ing and under-
going. In architecture, for example, Dewey maintains that 
the plans should grow i!S t he building grows. He feels that 
the aesthetic quality of medieval cathedrals, nis due in 
some measure to the fa ,~t that their constructions were not 
so much controlled by plans and specifications made in 
1. ill£., p. 45. 2. Ibid. , p. 48. 
3. ~Cbid ., p. 138. 
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advance as is now the case.nl 
It is for this reason that inspiration is not an 
antecedently controlling factor in art; it rather serves 
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the artist in the initial phase of his experience. The 
artist may be inspired in the sense of being excited about 
the artistic possibilities offered by a present situation. 
But once his work is underway , he "is controlled by his grasp 
of the connection bet·ween \vh:3_t he has already done and what 
he is to do next. 112 Such a grasp requires thought, and an 
artist thinks about his subject-matter no less than a scien-
tist about his.J The objective materials of a work-in-
production provide new possibilities for the development of 
the work, and it is reflection on these pos s ibilities, in con-
junction with the aesthetic perception of what is already done, 
that determines the further development of the work . 
In concluding this section, it is si gnificant to note 
that for Dewey the expressiveness of the completed work is 
due to the fact tha t i t is the product of an integral ex-
perience , and 11 that it presents a thorough and complete in-
terpenetration of the materials of undergoing and of action . n4 
The fusion of undergoing and doing is complete i n the object, 
whether it is considered as aesthetic or artistic object, 
or as both. The final significance of this fusion is that 
1 . Ibid., p . 52. 
J. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p . 45. 
4. Ibid., p . 103. 
art is the product of the interaction of the organism with 
the world. The experience that art intensifies is neither 
wholly nin 11 the self, nor wholly constituted by relations 
in the environment. As Dewey says, nthe moments when the 
creature is both most alive and most composed and concen-
trated are those of fullest intercourse with the environ-
ment, in which sensuous material and relations are most 
completely merged . nl The fusion and merging of self and 
t he world is, moreover, so complete in art that, "no 
distinction of self and obj ect exists in it, since • . . 
organism and environment cooperate to institute an experi-
ence in which the two ~re so fully integrated that each 
disappears.n2 
Although in the making of a work of art, there is 
complete integration of creation and perception, it is yet 
possible to distinguish in reflection certain characteris-
tics, or nobjective conditionsn which a work of art must 
exemplify if it is to ::>erve adequately as object for .§!!. ex-
~erience.3 The nature of these conditions and characteris-
t ics can now be examin,3d. 
i ii . Artistic Form 
The formal characteristics of a work of art are 
similar to the charact t~ri sties of an experience, and in the 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., p. 249. 
3. Ibid., pp. 146-47. 
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following discussion of form there is frequent reference to 
the temporal and qualitative unity, as well as the intrinsic 
integration of elements that constitute the close of, ~ 
experience. Form does not pertain exclusively to works of 
art, since any experience that is ~ experience also has 
f orm. 
Wherever perception has not been blunted and per-
verted, there is an inevitable tendency to arrange 
events and objects with reference to the demands 
of complete and unified perception. Fonn is a 
character of everr experience that is an experience. 
Art in its specific sense enacts more deliberately 
and fully the conditions that effect this unity. 
Form may then be defined as the operation of forces 
that carry the exeerience of an event, object, scene, 
and situation to its own integral fulfillment.! 
For the reason that form is the disposition of these nforcesn 
in the work of art, the problem of discovering the nature of 
f orm is identical with the problem of discovering the means 
by which ..illl experience is carried to its close.2 
The means by which ~ experience is carried to its 
close are the na tural means provided by the interaction of 
man with his environme:1t. They are not found in some sepa-
rate and independent "significant form" or "aesthetic emo-
tion, n terms which oft an signify the separation of organism 
and environment. The first, and perhaps most basic of these 
natural means, or "forGes," is rhythm. 
De\vey defines rhythm as an "ordered variation of 
1. Ibid., p . 137. 2. Ibid. 
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changes.'Tl In this definition, 11 variation of changes" refers 
to the fact that rhythm is not simply an even flow of un-
varying motion, which is stagnation, but that it is consti-
tuted by changes of intensity in pause and motion over the 
course of an integral novement. The word "orderedrr means 
that these changes are, in the art object, i ntelligently 
selected, not the outcJme of caprice. In the course of such 
a movement, each rhythmic development is the differentiation 
of a part within the w:1ole work of art. Such differentia-
tion creates rra suspens e that is a demand for something to 
come,rr for it has added nto the force of what went before.rr2 
Rhythm, as the orderin1~ of changes, involves recurrence . 
Recurrence is not of units but of relationships th t rrsum 
up and carry forward to the cl ose of the work. n3 Each 
rhythmic recurrence is novel insofar as it occurs in a dif-
ferent context within the whole work, and it thus draws 
attention to itself as a distinc,t part of the whole.4 Yet 
each recurrence connec ~ :; s i t'self v-ri th the whole of the work 
because of its interaction, association, a nd relation to 
other parts. 5 rrhus, the r hythmic development of a work "is 
not a variation in a s :Lngle feature but a modulation of the 
entire pervasive and unifying qualitative substratumn of 
1 • I bi d • , p • 15 it • 
3 . Ibid. , p. 166. 
5. Ibid . 
2. Ibid., p . 155. 
4. Ibid. 
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the work.l 
Rhythm, Dewey believes, "is a universal scheme o.f 
existence, underlying all realization of order in change, 
it pervades all the arts ."2 Rhythm is "the basic pattern 
o.f the relations of the live creature to his environment, n3 
and in art it is the basic ingredient in all artistic form. 
It is generated naturally through the interaction of organ-
ism and environment, h.1t in art it is the key to artistic 
expression and the formal characteristics of the object 
which make it expressi'l.re. 4 
Dewey underlines this .fact vvhen he says that, "the 
resistance offered to immediate expression of emotion is 
precisely that which C•Jmpel s it to assume rhythmic form." 5 
1tlithout the internal t;msion built up by the controlling 
resistance of the obje~tive work o.f art, emotional expression 
"would be a fluid rush to a straightaway mark; there would 
be nothing that could :Je called development and fulfill-
ment . n6 But resistanc a to direct expression constitutes 
the possibility of dev ·~lopment and fulfillment, and as suc h 
creates the artistic problem of how expressively to embody 
t he artist's inspiration in a medium. Rhythm is paramount 
in artistic creation bt3cause it is a necessary outcome of 
1. Ibid., p. 155. 2. Ibid., p .. 150 . 
3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., pp. 138, 156 . 
5. Ibid., p. 156. 6. Ibid., p. 138. 
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the expressive use of the medium, as opposed to direct self-
expression. Finally, it is the rhythmic development of ~ 
experience that constitutes the primary force carrying it 
to fulfillment;l it is also the most important condition 
an obje~t must satisfy if it is t o meet the perceptual de-
mands of~ experience, i.ea, if it is to be an art object. 
There are, howe'!Ter, certain other conditions of form 
which go to define mor -~ clearly the nature of rhythmic form . 
These are the characte:ristics of continuity, cumulation, con-
s ervation, and anticipa.tion, which name distinctions v'lithin 
rhythmic form. Dewey ~ xplains that there is no movement 
tovtard a consummation 1'1ithout progressive massing of values, 
which he terms "a cumulative effect . "2 A cumulative effect, 
i n turn, cannot exist ,dthout conservation of the import of 
what has preceded. In addition, the continuity of an experi -
ence cannot be achieved unless there is anticipation, through 
the accumulated import, of what is to come.3 The consumma-
tion of an experience :.s relative, for the end i s anticipat ed 
by the continuous, cumulative, conservation of import through-
out the experience, wh :~ le the final integration of rhythmic 
i'orm is significant as the completion of the entire process, 
i.e., it is a true con~mmmation of what has gone before, not 
just the final term in a mechanical procession of unrelated 
events . 
1 . Ibid. 2. Ibid . , pp . 137-38. 3. Ibid. 
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However, the co:1summatory function of the art object 
is not exhausted in the act of compl etion, but contains two 
other elements also. ::tirst, it presents something new. A 
const~mation in art is not that of an antecedently held plan, 
but is the fresh turn ,:>f developments which truly completes 
what has gone before. Such a completion adds something novel 
to the process it sums up, so it is more than just a calcu-
lated, mechanical end.l Second, the consummation is final 
only externally, for i 1:, has an effect which "presses forward 
in further experiences, even if only subconsciously.n2 The 
consummation of .§!!. exp13rience is, then, both intrinsic en-
joyment of the object as well as the occasion for its instru-
mental function in future experience.3 
The form of a ~lrk of art exhibits the "operation of 
forces" that carry an 13xperience to a consummation. It is 
the operation of these forces, iae., rhythmic development 
through the tension bu:Llt up from the resistance of objective 
materials, and the expression of this tension through cumu-
lation, conservation, <mticipation, and ·continuity of ener-
gies, that any object must · have if it is to manifest artistic 
form. Dewey, then, ma:Lnt ains that nthere can be no esthetic 
experience apart from an "object," and that the object must 
satisfy these formal conditions without which an aesthetic 
experience cannot be.4 
1. Art as Exper j. ence, p. 139. 
3. Ibid., p. 139. 
2. Ibid., p. 138. 
4. !Qi£., pp. 146-47. 
109 
The form of a W)rk of art is not only the means of 
bringing an experience to consummation, but is also the fac-
tor accounting for the quality of lflivingness" which such 
experience has. Form in art is a development in time, and 
it cannot therefore be instantaneously perceived. "An in-
stantaneous experience is an impossibility, biologically and 
p sychologi cally . An experience is a product, on e might al-
most say a by-product, of continuous and cumulative inter-
action of an organic s ·:df with the world. nl In art, the form 
of a vTork, as its development in time, is well exemplified 
in music: 
Music in its evid•3nt temporal emphasis illustrates 
perhaps better than any other art the sense in which 
form is the moving integration of an experience. In 
music, form ••• develops with the hearing of the 
music . Any point in the musical development ••• 
is what it is in ·~hat musical object ••• by virtue 
of what has gone ·)efore and what is impinging or 
prophesied. • •• The "form" of the music becomes 
form in the caree::- of the listening . 2 
The f act t hat a work of art has a "career," a history, ac-
counts for the "impres::iion of life" th e . work conveys.3 
This "impression of life1' depends on perception of 
uhe object as having a history, as the object is "perceived 
a t a particular point of its development."4 The fact that 
the object has a "historyn means not only that it satisfies 
the formal conditions ::or an experience, but also that it 
1. Ibid., p. 220. 
3. Ibid., p. 176 . 
2. Ibid., p. 184. 
4. Ibid. 
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is a particular organizat ion of qualities bearing relations 
to the past. 
In the aesthetic object the object operates ••• 
to pull together energies that have been sepa-
rately occupied in dealing with many different 
t hings on different occasions, and to give them 
t hat particular rhythmic organization we have 
called • •• clarification, intensification, con-
centrat ion.l 
The art object is aided in such an integration by 
the nature of perception itself. Dewey points out t hat 
"nothing is perceived except when different senses work in 
relat ion with one another except when the energy of one 
'...center' is communicated to others. n2 For this reason, noth-
ing can be perceived by the operation of one sense alone, 
e .g8, sheer vision, or hearing, do not exist.3 The connec-
tions instituted by the interactions of the senses means that 
any particular sense-perception in the present is affected by 
qualiti es of other sense-perceptions from the past. nrr the 
eye is the organ primarily active, then the color quality is 
affected by qualities of other senses overtly active in 
earlier experiences. In this way it is affected with a his -
t ory; there is an object with a past. n4 
Becrtuse there can be no perception of an object except 
in a process developing in time, any particular object per-
ceived is a focal point which has an undefined "background." 
1. Ibid., pp. 176-77. 
3. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p8 175. 
4. f.2i£.. 
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Without perception of a focal object, i. e ., an object with 
a history, experience is confused and incoherent.l It is 
incoherent bec ause it has no continuity with the past. Such 
a complete break with past experience renders present ex-
perienc e meaningless, for it then has no connection with the 
temporal growth of life. This separation from the growth of 
life is typical of the non-aesthetic . 
A work of art, however, is par excellence a focal 
object . In art, the object is an actualization in the here 
and now of experience that has "an indefinite total setting.n2 
In virtue of this fact, 11 a work of art elicits and accentu-
ates the quality of being a whole and of belonging to the 
larger, all-inclusive whole which is the universe in which 
we live ."3 It is significant that, in and through the nature 
of the object as ~ focus for an experience, art is again re-
lated to "normal experience." 11 The universe in which we 
live" is the universe of normal experience, and in art such 
experience is made intelligible in and through a particular 
organization a~d concentration of its aesthetic elements in 
t he work of art. Art "expresses in a concentrated way the 
shocks and instabilities, the conflicts and resolutions that 
are the dramatic changes enacted upon the more enduring 
background of nature and human life."4 
1 . Ibid., p . 195. 
3. Ibid., p . 195. 
2. Ibid., p. 192 . 
4. Ibid., p. 236. 
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We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond 
this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality 
of the world in which we live in our ordinary exper-
iences . We are carried out beyond our s elves to find 
ourselves . I can s ee no psychological ground for 
such properties of an experi ence save that, somehow, 
the vmrk of art operates t o deepen and to raise to 
great clarity that sense of an enveloping undefined 
v.J'hole that accompanies every normal experience . This 
whole is then felt as an expansion of ourselves.l 
Aesthetic experience and its object make experience 
more intelligible and intensify t he meanings which are often 
faintly grasped and disparate in ordinary experience. The 
a chievement of such intense experience engages the self in 
a controlled interaction with the world, vlhich, for man, is 
largely constituted by the society in which he lives. Art, 
then, has no small social importance. This chapter now 
concludes with a brief examination of Dewey's conception of 
the relation of art to society. 
6. Art and Society 
Throughout this chapter the exposition of Dewey's 
view of art as experience has contained many references to 
the nature of art as that which connects, fuses, and inte-
grates elements in experience . It has also been seen that 
all of the elements of the self are integrated in art, and 
that the subject (or self) is so merged with environment 
that in art distinctions between t he two pass away . 
1 . Ibid., p. 195. 
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Some of the otherwise separate elements which Dewey 
conceives as integrated in art are the following: aesthetic 
appreciation and artistic production, undergoing and doing, 
mind and matter, 1 theory and practice, ends and means, and 
subject and object. These elements, which are integrated 
in and t hrough reciprocal relations to each other, are not, 
Dewey maintains, integrated in the social life of the com-
munity. As Dewey puts it, "civilization is uncivil because 
human beings are divided into non-communicating sects, 
races, nations, classes , and cliques.n2 The reason for 
these separations is that civilization as a whole exhibits 
very few of the characteristics of artistic organization, 3' 
and, furthermore, such divisions have been sustained intel-
lectually in virtue of the traditional dualisms in philosophy 
and religion between theory and practice, ends and means, and 
mind and matter.4 
The significance of art for social development is, 
then, that art shows how divisions in experience are resolved. 
Expe~ience in the form of art, when reflected upon 
••• solves more problems i1'fhich have troubled 
philosophers and resolves more hard and fast dual-
isms than any other theme of thought ••• It 
1. Cf. Philosofhy and Civilization (Ne\v York: Minton, 
Balch & Company, 1933 , p. 302. 
· 2. Art as Experience, p. 336. 
3. Ibid., p . 338. 
4. cr. Reconstruction in PhilOSOE~' pp . 94-112 . 
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demonstrates the intersection in nature of indi-
vidual and generic; of chance and law, transform-
ing one into opportunity and the other into 
liberation; of instrumental and final ••.• lt 
demonstrates the gratuitous falsity of notions 
that divide overt and executive activity from 
thought and feeling and thus separate mind and 
matter .l 
For the reason that art resolves so many dualisms, Dewey 
urges that the aesthetic quality of an experience ought to 
be conferred on as many modes o f human activity as possible. 
This is why art can be "a remaking of the experience of the 
community in the direction of greater order and unity.n2 
To illustrate hmv the office of art can function to 
cr2ate greater unity in society, two of the social dualisms 
which Dewey laments are now very briefly examined , along 
with their resolution through application of the principles 
of artistic form . 
There is little doubt that there are divisions, often 
cas ing violent clashes, between "sects, races, and nations. ~ 
Dewey thinks that these divisions can be decreased through 
the communicative function of art. Artistic "expression 
strikes below the barriers that separate human being s from 
one another. Since art is the most universal form of lan-
guage, since it is constituted, even apart from literature, 
by the common qualities ofthe public world, it is the most 
1. Experience and Nature , p. 393. 
2. Art as Experience, p. 81 . 
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universal and freest form of communication.nl Moreover, 
because art ••• is expressive of a deep-sea.ted 
attitude of adjustment, of an underlying idea 
and ideal of generic human attitude, the Drt 
characteristic of a civilization is the means 
for entering sympathetically into the deepest 
elements in the experience of remote and foreign 
civilizations.2 
Insofar as art can achieve this sympathetic participation 
for humanity, it renders a particular society, race, or 
sect, less provincial, and provides opportunity for under-
standing of the attitudes basic in other forms of experi-
ence.3 Such understanding amounts to the sharing of values 
by individuals of differing cultures.4 When values can be 
shared, the chances of violent clashes and rigid divisions 
of interest might well decrease appreciably.5 
The second social division for illustration here is 
that between classes. This division is related to another 
division, that between the attitudes engendered by physical 
science and aesthetic appreciation. This latter dualism 
Dewey considers to be the most serious and far reaching 
division in modern society ; "Surely there is no more sig-
nificant question before the world than this question of 
1 . Ibid . , p. 270 . 
2 . Ibid., p . 332. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 336. 
5. An instance of this philosophy and its effect is 
perhaps evident today in Soviet -American cultural interchange. 
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the possibility and method of reconciliation of the attitudes 
o:f practic al science and ••• esthetic appreciation.nl He 
goes on to say that both of these attitudes are essential 
f or the health of society. W-ithout the attitude of science 
man becomes the plaything of nature, while without aesthetic 
experience and ap preciation he becomes an 1'economic mon-
ster .n2 
That there can be a positive, operational r elation 
of art to social process depends on the reconciliation of 
the attitudes of practical science and art. The division is 
possible to reconcile, since it is not caused by the subject 
matter of science or art, or by the products of science or 
art, but by the private use of property for private profit, 
as well as other non-aesthetic elements in the economic sys-
tem.3 These non-aesthetic elements will be overcome when 
nthe values that lead to production and intelligent enjoy-
ment of art have • • • fbeen7 incorporated into the system 
of soci a l relationships. n4 
The values, or what might be called the reciprocal 
experiential relations, that enter into the experience of 
art, could operate in social-industrial institutions to 
1. Reconstruction in Philosophy, p . 109 . 
2. Ibid. 
3. Art as Experience, p. 344 . 
4. Ibid. 
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resolve the separation of the management class from the 
class of workers. After saying that the organism has a 
natural desire for satisfaction in the materials of experi-
ence, Dewey complains that such satisfaction is most diffi-
cult to achieve under present industrial social relations. 
The industrial \vorker is separated from the final use of 
the product he works to produce. Thus, industrial labor, 
under present conditions, is non-aesthetic because it lacks 
an integration of doing and undergoing, or perception and 
creation. It does not have the aesthetic quality of ~ ex-
perience. Dewey formulates the problem and its solution in 
this way : 
The surroundings which man has made, under the influ-
ence of modern industry, afford less fulfillment and 
more repulsion than at any previous time . • • • No 
permanent solution is possible save in a radical so-
cial alteration, which effects the degree and kind 
of participation the worker has in the production 
and social disposition of the wares he produces. Only 
such a change will seriously modify the content of 
experience into which creation of objects made for 
use enters. And this modification of the nature of 
experience is the finally determining element in the 
esthetic quality of the experience of things pro-
duced.l 
Therein Dewey envisions a social reconstruction in which 
the management class and the laboring class would somehow 
integrate their interests and effort ·s. with the purpose of 
conferring aesthetic quality on all phases of industrial 
production. 
1. Ibid., p. 343. 
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For Dewey, the two illustrations attest to the fact 
that art should be an integral part of the development of a 
society, not simply a cultural frill. In art, "meanings 
have received objective expression" and may "endure.nl As 
such, works of art become part of the en vironment," and in-
teraction with this phase of the environment is the axis of 
continuity in the life of civilization."2 It is in this 
sense that the ultimate quality of a culture is determined 
by its art, through its influence, extent, and quality.3 
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Hovvever, because of the non-aesthetic character of 
much of modern society, and because art is no longer a part 
of "the substantial life of the community,n4 contemporary 
civilization manifests a rtdiffuseness and incoherence" in 
its "consensus of beliefs," which in turn is reflected in 
its art.5 Greater coherence in both the arts and society 
may be realized when art and society interact and interpene-
trate each other so that art permeates life and life perme-
ates art. "The problem of recovering an organic place for 
art in civilization is like the problem of reorganizing our 
heritage from the past and the insights of present knowledge 
into a coherent and integrated imaginative union. n6 Such a 
reorganization would, by its very nature, confer aesthetic 
l. Ibid., p . 326. 2. Ibid. 
3 .. Ibid., p. 345 .. 4. Ibid., pp. 327-28. 
5. Ibid., p. 340. 6. Ibid., p. 338. 
quality on social relations. 
The significance of art for society is, then, as 
Dewey conceives it, found in the f act that art as experi-
ence is the outstanding example of how diverse elements in 
experience are organically related. The separation of these 
elements, which divests them of all aesthetic quality, is 
illustrated in the mechanical, routine connection of elements 
in contemporary industrial society. It is al so illustrated 
in the incoherence in society caused by a largely non-
aesthetic economic system. 
But if art does positively operate to remake nthe 
experience of the community in the direction of greater order 
and unity,nl then Dewey envisions these consequences: 
Art will not be a luxury, a stranger to the daily 
occupations of making a living. Making a living 
economically speaking, will be at one with making 
a life that is worth living. And when the emotional 
force, the mystic force one might say, of communi-
cation, of the miracle of shared life and shared 
experience is spontaneously felt, the hardness and 
crudeness of contemporary life will be bathed in the 
light that never was on land or sea.2 
1. Dewey's position on the relation of art and soci-
ety is perhaps carried to its logical conclusion by Irwin 
Edman, who says ; nArt is human intelligence playing over 
the natural scene, in ~eniously affecting it toward the ful -
fillment of human purposes. A complete civilization ••• 
would be coincident with complete intelligence. Life in 
such a state vvould be identical with art ." Arts and The Man 
(New York: VJ. W. Norton & Company, 1939), p . · 36. 
2. Reconstruction in Philoso phy, p. 164. 
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7 . Summary 
The main points in this chapter are summarized in the 
following. 
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Dev.rey argues that philosophy is an experimental in-
quiry into the possibilities of experience with an aim to 
clarify the meanings of social and moral conflicts; it is a 
critic ism of all criticisms, and, employing the natural goods 
of experience, functions to liberate and reorganize the val-
ues in society. 
In aesthetics, Dewey's purpose is to show the con-
tinuity between art and other areas of experience . To achieve 
th i s purpose, Dewey first points out that there are aesthetic 
elements in "normalrt experience, e.g., balance, harmony, 
equilibrium, and rhythm, which issue from the interaction 
of organism and environment. 
In what Devvey calls .§!!. experience, these and other 
aesthetic elements become dominant. As contrasted with 
routine or mechanical experience, an experience has temporal 
unity, qualitative unity, unity in variety, and a true con-
summation. It is a contextual whole, and the dynamic move-
ment of events in i t are contextually related. An experience 
is distinctively aesthetic when the factors that determine 
it are made manifest for their own sake. 
Aesthetic perception is characterized as including 
both surrender and heightened activity . Surrender denotes 
that aesthetic perc eption involves undergoing, whereas 
heightened activity means that it involves active r e -
creation of the object, as well . Perception is controll ed 
throug h the reciproc al, organic rel ation of undergo i ng and 
doing . Dewey insists that the artistic obj ect cannot be 
appreciated unless perception is informed by the manner of 
i ts production. 
Dewey argues that emotions enter into aest hetic ex -
perience, not, however , as independent affective states, but 
rat her as controlled by the past and by the entire context 
of an experience. P rticularly, emotions are qualified by 
the art ob j ect, and are thus "tiedn to an expressive obj ect . 
For this reason, aesthetic experience includes a transforma-
tion of natural emoti ons into aesthetic emotions. 
In addition to emoti on, thought, conation, action, 
sensory experience, and purpose, all enter i nto t h e con-
textual whole that is an aesthetic experience. Such experi -
ence brings all th e various f actors of the self i nto full 
and active participation in the impassioned appreciation of 
the object. 
Artistic production also involves emotive expression, 
but in the creative act expression is controlled by an in-
telligent use of media and by the context in which it occurs, 
viz., an environing situation. Further, the artist cannot 
avoid being influenced by his past experience, and for this 
reason what he expresses in the present is an imagina.tive 
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projection of meanings and values undergone in the past as 
well as the present. 
In the creation of art there is overt making of an 
ob ject ,; how·ever, such making is artist i c tAfhen its perceived 
result at ea ch phase of development has controlled the man-
ner of production. Hence, aesthe tic undergoing and artistic 
doing are reciprocally related in the c reative process. The 
fu sion of undergoing and doing is complete in t h e artistic 
object. 
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Form in art is the operation of energies that bring 
an experience to fulfillment. The primary energy, or force, 
effe cting this end is rhythmic development, which exhibits 
the formal characteristics of cumulation, conservati on, con-
t;inuity, and anticipation. 
Dewey urges that art is important for social develop-
men t insofar as it points the way for the resolution of divi-
sions in the experience of the community. Art, i f it were 
an i nt egral part of communal life, could reconstruct social 
institutions in the direction of a unity and order consonant 
with artistic form itself. Societal experience, if it i s 
genuine experience, must manifest the aesthetic-artistic 
quali ty that constitutes an experience. 
CHAPTER IV 
COMPARISON AND EVALUATION 
This chapter presents a brief comparison and evalua-
tion of Dewey's and Langer's aesthetics. The comparative 
exposition is formulated by a critical analysis of some 
important areas in which their theories may be related and 
contrasted. The evaluation suggests certain problems that 
may be observed in the aesthetics of Dewey and Langer. 
These problems are pointed out by independent analyses of 
t heir theories, more or less apart from comparative import. 
1. Areas of Contrast and Comparison 
i. Conception of Philosophy 
The first point that may be noted is that Dewey and 
Langer develop their aesthetics from essentially different 
philosophical orientations. For Dewey, philosophy is an ex-
perimental, systematic criticism of all critici,sms;l it occurs 
in a cultural setting and is instrumental in effecting cul-
tural reconstruction.2 Langer agrees that philosophy is a 
systematic study, but goes on to define it as the study of 
meanings, comprising all the rational sciences, and governed 
by the principle of drawing logical implications from the 
1. Experience and Nature, p. 39S. 
2. Schilpp, p. S6. 
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basic notions derived from experience. 
All philosophy is a study of what is implied in the 
fundamental notions which are our natural uncon-
scious formulations of experience. • •• Philosophy, 
which is the s stematic stud of meanin s com rises 
all the rational sciences. It is a group of dis-
ciplines which are all governed by the principle of 
seeking implications, i.e., logical connections • 
• • • Vwhatever its ultimate ideal may be, its imine-
diate task is always the explication of whatever 
ideas it is dealing with; and its immediate results, 
the production of it least a few clear notions from 
definite premises. 
Dewey's view of philosophy gives special emphasis to 
philosophy as experimental, instrumental {to social recon-
struction), and synoptic. Dewey agrees with Langer that 
philosophy has the task of clarifying meanings on the the-
oretical level,2 but he insists that it also functions to 
nclarify, liberate and extend the goods which inhere in the 
naturally generated functions of experience.n3 As Randall 
has suggested,4 Dewey views philosophy as instrumental to 
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resolving concrete social conflicts in a culture. To achieve 
this instrumentality, philosophy "must become operative and 
experimental. "5 Langer, on the other hand, in some sense 
views philosophy as a more strictly intellectual discipline, 
since it is governed by the principle of seeking logical 
1. The Practice of Philosophy, pp. 35-36. 
2. Experience and Nature, pp. 410-411. 
3. Ibid., p. 407. 
4. Cf. above , p. 73. 
5. Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 106. 
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implications. For Langer, philosophy is a study of the 
logic of meanings, rather than of the means and ends of 
so ci al reform. 
Meanings are the object of all philosophical re-
search. The ability to construe them is the gift 
of understanding; and the swift, independent, 
clear-sighted appreciation of meanings • • • is 
wisdom, the goal of philosophy.! 
In contrast with Dewey's emphasis on philosophy as 
an organ for the enrichment of the life of the community, 
Langer seems to be saying that philosophy is primarily an 
organ for the enrichment of the understanding of meanings. 
Although neither one of these interpretations necessarily 
excludes the other, it does s eem probable that they are dif-
ferent emphases about the nature and function of philosophy. 
If this supposition is correct, it may explain, in part at 
least, the differences between Langer's and De\<rey' s respec-
tive aims in aesthetics. 
ii. Aims in Aesthetics 
Langer's purpose in aesthetics is to clarify the 
meanings of many of the .terms ordinarily found in theories 
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of art, as well as to interpret art as a form of symbolism.2 
She approaches aesthetic theory from the "studio standpoint," 
i.e., from the perspective of the l."iork of art and how it is 
1. The Practice of Philosophy, p. 221. Emphasis 
mine. 
2. Feeling and Form, pp. vii-viii. 
created.l At the srune time, she specifically rejects the 
notion of "experiencen as a useful or fecund concept for 
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the explanation of art. 2 Dewey 1 however, in aiming to sho\"T 
how art is continuous with other kinds of experience,3 uses 
the notion of experience as the basic category of explana-
tion in his aesthetics. Dewey believes that the major task 
of aesthetics is to "restore continuity between the refined 
and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and 
the everyday events, doings, and sufferings that are univer-
sally recognized to constitute experience.~ 
The difference between using experience, as Dewey 
does, or symbolism, as Langer does, to explain art may well 
constitute the major point of contrast between the aims of 
Dewey and Langer. Whereas Langer intends to show how art 
is a symbolical transformation of experience, Dewey aims to 
show how art is a distinctive type of experience that is con-
nected with other kinds of experience. There are frequent 
examples of their different aims in many of the following 
areas of comparison. 
iii. Appreciation 
The appreciative or aesthetic phase of experience is, 
1. Ibid., p. 10. 
2. Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
). Art as Ex12erience, pp. 3, 10. 
4. Ibid., p. ). 
according to Dewey, a direct experiential undergoing.l 
Undergoing is not typically disinterested or distanced, but 
rather engages the full energy of all the aspects of the 
self. 2 Even though appreciation involves surrender and is 
controlled through the integrations and reciprocal relations 
of ~ experience of an object, it nevertheless requires 
heightened activity to re-create the object. In contrast 
to De\l>rey, Langer believes that aesthetic appreciation is 
distanced. By "distance," Langer means that the appreciator 
separates the art object from his own personal, practical 
interests.3 If the object is not distanced, then what hap-
pens is that the appreciator confuses "a symbol, which lets 
us conceive its object, and a sign, which causes us to deal 
v-li th what it means."4 The idea of distance does not imper-
sonalize art but means that the emotive contents of art are 
presented directly to understanding.5 Direct presentation to 
understanding invites the aesthetic percipient to conceive 
the particular idea of feeling formulated in the artistic 
object, \oJ"i thout an actual occasion or experience wherein 
these feelings are undergone.6 
1. Ibid., p. 53. 
2. Ibid., p. 256. 
3. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 181. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., p. 180. 
6. Ibid. 
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Because works of art are symbolical forms that in-
vite conceptual behavior, appreciation of them does not, 
for Langer, ,involve active participation of all the psycho-
logical elements of the self, as it does for Dewey. Dewey 
argues that will, desire, purpose, need, affection, and ac-
tion all participate in the contextual whole of an aesthetic 
experience.l Langer, however, contends that a work of art 
is only an appet:trance of what these subjective states are 
like, and, rather than being a stimulus for subjective ex-
perience, is a symbolical formulation of what such experi-
ence is like, which, in turn, invites conception of it. 
Thus, for the reason that Langer characterizes appreciation 
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as being primarily conceptual, and not experiential in the 
full sense that Dewey gives to the term experience, she dis-
agrees with Dewey as to the nature of aesthetic appreciation--
at least insofar as he insists that it is experience in which 
all the aspects of the self are fully active. 
iv. Perception 
Langer's basis for classifying the different arts 
presupposes a theory of perception to which Dewey v1ould 
strongly object. According to Langer, a work of art is en-
tirely created, an illusion that exists for perception alone.2 
1. Art as Experience, pp. 256-57. 
2. Problems of Art, p. 148. 
Furtherrnore, each art engenders a particular dimension of 
perception through present at ion of a special image of real-
ity.l Thus, Langer classifies the different arts by the 
special primary illusions they beget, e.g., the primary 
illusion of plastic art is virtual space, and of music is 
virtual time. Everything in painting, for example, is purely 
visual, and everything in music is purely auditory.2 
Whatever the advantages of this classification may 
be,3 Dewey points out that the exclusive operation of one 
perceptual organ · is contrary to the nature of perception. 
Any particular perception involves the energies of the whole 
perceptual apparatus,4 and is, therefore, affected by inter-
actions with other perceptions, as well as being partly con-
stituted by the qualities and meanings of past perceptions. 
On Dewey's view of perception, Langer's theory of primary 
illusions is impossible since sheer vision and sheer audi-
tion do not occur.5 
v. Expression 
It is interesting to note that Dewey and Langer both 
reject any view of art as essentially the unmitigated 
1. Ibid., p. 81. 
2. Ibid • . Cf. also Feeling and Form, pp. 150-166. 
3. Cf. above, pp. 35-37. 
4. Art as Experience, p. 175. 
5. Ibid. 
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expression of a self, although their reasons for rejecting 
the view are quite different. For Dewey, expression per se 
is not artistic because it is only an expulsion of energy 
without intelligent direction or embodiment in objective 
materials. Expression becomes artistic when it is con-
trolled by resisting objective materials,, by the intelli-
gent use of such materials as media, and by the funded 
meanings from past experience.l Langer agrees with Dewey's 
statement that expression m~st be controlled to be artistic, 
but for her the controlling element in artistic expression 
is the creation of fo1~: sheer expression is not art be-
cause it requires no form.2 Dewey would not deny that to 
be artistic expression must be given form,3 yet his view of 
how form is created is not the same as Langer's, as will be 
pointed out now. 
vi. The Creative Process 
According to Dewey, an artist does not create ex-
pressive form in terms of an antecedently held plan,4 but 
rather in and through the organic ally related experiences 
1. Ibid., pp. 62, 64, 89. 
2. Philos~ in a New Ke~, p. 175. 
3. Art as Experience, p. 65. 
4. Ibid., p. 138. 
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of undergoing and doing. 1 The basic and controlling factor 
in the production of art is the artist's aesthetic experi-
ence of the artistic effects he has produced.2 Artistic 
effects are artistic only insofar as their production is 
qualified by perceptual experience of them as aesthetically 
adequate. It is in this sense that the objective materials 
in which artistic inspiration becomes embodied are suggestive, 
indeed controlling, for the question of further production. 
Langer does not believe that "production" 'is a very 
fortunate term for describing what an artist does: aluminum 
pots and toothpastes, for example, are produced, but works 
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of art are created.3 The term creation in Langer's aesthe-
tics is above all other things a reference to the abstrac-
tion of form,4 \'Thich is the initial phase in artistic creation. 
Whereas for Dewey artistic "productionn is organically tied 
up '\vi th direct experiential undergoing, for Langer ncreation~' 
is controlled by an initial grasp of the form the work is to 
take. This initial grasp is the idea, or commanding form of 
the work-to-be-created, as it is nin the artist's head.n5 
The commanding form contains the work of art in embryo, for 
1. Ibid., pp. 45, 48. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Problems of Art, pp. 27-28. 
4. Cf. above, p. 35. 
5. Feeling and Form, pp. 122, 389. 
it is the artist's vision of what he is to do; it contains 
the vmrk implicitly.l The further development of the work 
is consonant with the nature of its commanding form, al-
though Langer agrees with Dewey that artistic materials can 
be suggestive in the further developmertt of the work, so 
long as such suggestion is coherent with the commanding 
form.2 
For Dewey, then, the production of a work of art is 
primarily a development issuing from an experience of 
undergoing-doing, while for Langer creation is the embodi-
ment of an original idea of form, and of what is formally 
significant. 
vii. Form and Experience 
Artistic form is defined by Dewey as the operation 
of forces that carry the experience of an object to its own 
integral fulfillment.3 Hence, there is no artistic form 
without the having of an experience in which these forces 
operate. Langer contends that form is hot had in experience 
as such, but is rather an abstraction of a particular con-
figuration, or Gestalt, from experience.4 For this reason, 
1. Ibid., p. 122. 
2. Ibid., p. 390. 
3. Art as Experience, p. 137. 
4. Problems of Art, p. 165. Cf. also, Feeling and 
Form, p. 50. 
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artistic form is primarily a logical and not an experiential 
category. Langer would apparently insist that form is not 
the experience of a structure, but rather the understanding 
and recognition of one apart from the actual world of anx-
ious circlli~stance and experience.l Since form in art is an 
abstraction from reality, it is wholly created, and imports 
nothing from reality as such.2 
The symbolic forms presented in art invite insight 
into and understanding of the patterns of sentience they 
formula te. In comparison, De\vey holds that an art object 
is artistically successful in the degree to which it provides 
the occasion for ~ experience. An experience, even though 
it is controlled, includes an emotional tone and affective 
undergoing; since it is an experience of form, it is quite 
different from what Langer means by logical3 understanding, 
or intuition, of a formal structure. 
viii. Meaning and Knowledge 
A primary feature of Langer's aesthetics is that she 
retains the idea of "significant form" as central in art, 
and develops as vie ll a theory in which it truly is signifi-
cant. Significant form has significance, or meaning, but 
l. Problems of Art, p. 72. 
2. Ibid., pp. 28, 31, 33. 
3. For the sense in vlhich Langer uses the term 
"logical," cf. below, p. 1 39. 
134 
not in a linguistic, pro positional s ense. The meaning of 
significant form is instead that of a presentational symbol, 
and for this reason Langer calls it vital import instead of 
meaning . The vital import of significant form is that it 
reveals the abstracted patt erns of sentience directly to in-
tuition.l Art has meaning in the sense t hat it s forms have 
vital i mport. 
Dewey is in accord with Langer that art has meaning , 
but f or diff erent reasons than she elaborates. Dewey says 
that art constitutes an experience in which "tangled scenes 
of life are made more intelligible • by presenting their 
meanings as the matter of a clarified, coherent, and inten-
sified or 'impassioned ' experience.n2 Here, Dewey partly 
agrees with Langer insofar as he holds that meanings in art 
are presented rather than stated, and therefore are non-
propo sitional. 3 
The significant distinction between the two views, 
hmhfever, is th at f or La..l1ger the meanings (vital import) pre-
s ented in art are known, i.e., are products of cognition, 
whereas for Dewey they are had in an aesthetic experience. 
Langer says that the feelings presented in art afford know-
ledge about the nature of sentient being, and that the 
1. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 180. 
2. Art as Experience, p. 290. 
3. Ibid., p. 84. 
-- . 
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symbolical projections of life in art are not occasions for 
experience--in Dewey's sense, at lea st--but for contempla-
tion of, and knowledge into, what the nature of experience 
is like. 1 It is for this reason that an art symbol can be 
either more or less "true'' to the life of feeling. 
For Dewey, on the other hand, values and meanings 
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clarified in aesthetic experience are simply had and enjoyed--
and that is a ll. 2 Art does not convey something about ex-
perience but is an experienc e itsel f. 3 
The poetic as dist inct from the prosaic, esthetic 
art as distinct from scientific, expr ession as 
distinct from statement, does something different 
from leading to an exnerience. It constitutes 
one.4 ~ 
In an aesthetic experience values and meanings ncontained 
in scattered and weaken ed ways in the material of other ex-
periencesn5 are concentrated and i ntensified "to fo rm a n 
experience worth while as an experience."6 Dewey agrees with 
Langer t hat art does not convey propositional meanings; how-
ever, in holding t hat in art meanings are cone ent rated and 
intensified in an experien ce, he differs from Langer insofar 
1. Problems of Art, p. 95. 
2. ExEerience and Nature , p. 396. 
). Art as ExQerience, pp. 84--85. 
4. Ibid., p. 8J . 
5. I bid ., p. 84. 
6. Ibid., p . 290. 
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as she holds that art convey s symboli cally i dea s about ex-
perience 1 but i s not a provocation for having the experience 
which it is about. 
ix . Organic Form 
Dewey and Lange r seem to be in substanti a l agreement 
in t he ir respective accounts of \hat organic form is and how 
it functi ons i n art. They bot h point out tha t the tensions 
and resolut i ons t hat are characterist i c of organic life, and 
that are given objective formulation and clarification in 
works of art, are what account for the organic nature of 
artistic form . l According to De'tTey, art can convey the "im-
pression of l ife" because i t objectif ies l ife processes.2 
Rhythmi c development , which is the "basic pattern of the re-
lations of the l i ve creature to his envi r onment, "3 is t he 
fundamental component of all art i sti c form. Norks of art 
seem to be "alive" because they convey to t he appreciator 
r' t he feeling of dealing vvith a caree r , "4 so that the object 
seems to have a dynamic temporal dev elopment through a past 
a..YJ. d a present. La.nger is ver y clos e to DevJey ' s view v-;hen she 
says that 'lvhat a i·'mrk of art 11 renders in its own l ogic al 
1. Cf., Dewey, Art as Experience 1 pp. 176, 18lh and, 
Langer, Problems of Art, p . 148 . 
2. Art a s 'P" • ..... xne rl enc e, p . 176 . 
3 . I bid., p. 150. 
4 . I bid., p. 176 . 
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projection must be true in design to the structure of experi-
ence . nl A vmrk of art shows the appearance of life bec .omse 
it is a created semblance of the functional unity extant in 
living organisms.2 It is the appearance of life that is pro-
jected in art that accounts for its vital import, or quality 
of "livingness.n3 
There is a contrast, nevertheless, in Dewey's and 
Langer's view of organic form. Langer thinks that the ob-
jectification of organic processes in art is what gives it 
the illusion of actual organic processes, so that the created 
illusion can connote felt tensions, the whole area of sub-
jective life.4 For the reason that the forms in art have a 
morphological similarity to the stream of tensions and reso-
lutions that constitute the life of feeling, art can have 
the symbolical function of giving insight into ~Arhat feelings 
are like .5 Dewey would not deny that organic form in art is 
similar to formal patterns in experience, since in fact "form 
is the moving integration of an experience. n6 Organic form 
1 . Feeling and Form, p . 373. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Problems of Art, p. 148. 
4. Feeling and Form, p. 373 . 
5. Philosophy in a New Key , p. 193. 
6. Art as Experience, p. 184. Italics mine. 
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in the work of art is essential if the work is to meet the 
demands of ~ experience, which are precisely those cha.rac-
teristics of organi c form ;,vhich Dewey describes as essential 
to the object if it is to be artistic.l Here, as in the 
differences already examined, Dev1ey and Langer disagree 
primarily on the question of whether art is a form of ex-
perience (Dewey), or, even though it be experience, a form 
of insight (Langer). Specifically, their difference in this 
i nstance concerns the problem of whether organic form in art 
invites us to contemplate about life, as Langer maintains, 
or whether it serves as material in ~ experience which is a 
particularly meaningful and intense concentration of life as 
experience, which is Dew~y's contention. 
x. Intuition 
In the final a nalysis, both Dewey and Langer believe 
t hat artistic form is immediately intuited or not seen at 
all, and that such intuition is essentially ineffable .2 For 
Lan ger intuition in art is logical since it is the under-
standing of the formal congruence between artistic forms and 
the forms of feeling. In contrast with Langer , Dewey believes 
that intuition in art is the felt presence of the qualitative 
unity, or "spirit" of a work.3 The intuition of qualitative 
1. Cf. above, pp . 105-109. 
2. Art as Experience, p. 226, and Feeling and Form, 
pp. 378-79. 
3. Art as Experience , p. 266. 
unity can only be had and enjoyed. 1 Despite the different 
meanings they attach to the term intuition, Langer2 and 
Dewey3 both fe el that aesthetic appreciation is an intrinsic 
gra sp of the object, and that meaning is grasped in it, not 
t hrough the mediation of discourse. 
x i . Art and Society 
A final point for comparison of the aesthetics of 
Dewey and Langer is their respective conceptions of the 
importance of art for th e broader life of the community. 
To an extent, their conceptions on this subject highlight 
t h e over-all comparative significance of their theories of 
a r t. Since both Langer and Dewey feel that art is meaning-
f u l activity, it is natural that they both assert that it 
ha s a positive value for the life of the community. 
In this connection, Langer states that because art 
i s an expressive formula tion of emotive experience it has 
t he educational function of training the senses to see re-
ality in expressive form, and thus to understand i t .4 Since 
m~~ 's healthy orientation in society depends more on the ful-
fillment of hi s unique basic need, viz., to symbolize reality, 
than on any degree of strictly biological or practical 
1. Experience and Nature, pp. 396-398. 
2. Problems of Art, p. 34. 
3. Experience and Nature, p. 398. 
4. Problems of Art, pp . 72-73. 
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adaptati on, art helps to fulfill the distinctly human need 
in sofar as it presents symbolical forms that convey concep-
tions of what reality and experience are like. 
There is no understanding v-I i thout symbolization, c:>..nd 
no symbolization without abstraction. Anything about 
reality, that is to be expressed and conveyed, must 
be abstracted from reality. There is no s ense in 
trying to convey-reality pure and simple. Even ex-
perience its elf cannot do that. What we understand, 
we conceive, and conception always involves formula-
tion, presentation, and t herefore abstraction.l 
Sinc e life is incoherent and disoriented without meaningful 
formulation and pro jection of experience, art, as such a 
projection of experience, has the very important soci al func-
tion of ~aking experience amenable to understanding.2 
That experience is incoherent and diffuse unless in-
telligently and me aningfully organized, and that art can 
effect such organization, is not a point which Dewey would 
debate . 3 He certainly agrees voli th Langer that art has a very 
important social function. 4 But for De11<1ey the prime impor-
t ance of art is not that it makes the world understandable , 
but rather that art is an intelligent and meaningful 
1. Ibid., p. 93. 
2. Feeling and Form, p . 245. 
3. Art as Experience, pp. 28, 38, 40, 43, 44, 327. 
4. For a more compl et e statement of Dewey's view of 
t he importance of art for society, c·:r. above, pp . ;1.13-120. 
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organization of experi ence so t hat it is i runed i at ely enriched 
wi th values and meanings experi entially had and enjoyed .l 
Experi ence t hat is ut t erly devoid of the reci proc a l relrttions 
~~d integr at ions incorporated in an experi ence, is not ex-
. h h . 2 per1ence wort av1ng . Dewey points out that in contempor-
ary industrial social r e lations t h ere is a mechanic al, 
routine, non-aesthetic connection of eleme nts. Industrial 
labor, for ex~1ple, is largely non-aesthetic bec ause the 
vmrker is separated from the final us e of the product he 
works to pro duce. Contrasted v'lith the organic rela tions of 
an experience, industria l experience lacks the i nt egration 
of do ing and under going , of production and perception, that · 
characterize the experience that is art .3 If the experience 
of t he coR~unity is to be meaningfully ordered and enriched 
1tvi th the immediate va lues had in art, then, according to 
Deviey, the aesthetic qua lity of ~ experience ought to be 
conferred on as many modes of human activity as po s :3ible. 
When this is done, art 1rill function to reconstruct con1munal 
experience to the en d of increased order and unity .4 
To say, with Dewey, that art organizes experience so 
t hat it is i mmedi ately enjoyable, is one thing; to say, with 
1. Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 164. 
2. Cf. above, pp . 84-85, for t he distinction Dewey 
makes betwe en aesthetic a nd non-aesthetic experience. 
3. Art as Experience, pp . JL..J-44. 
4. Ibid., p. 81. 
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Langer, tha t art formulates experience so that it can be un-
derstood, is another thing. To contrast the two views, one 
could say the.t Langer sees art as making the vmrld understand-
able, whereas Dewey sees it as making the world vmrth living 
in. These t1r;o views are not, of course, mutually exclusive. 
A world worth living in is one tha t is understandable. Al -
though Lang er believes that art trains the mind to see real-
ity in expressive form, whereas Dewey contends that art makes 
experience supremely v'rorth ·while as experience, they both 
agree that art is a very important activity for the coherent 
organization of human life. 
2. Areas of Criticism 
The comparative analysis has shown that the aesthetics 
of Dewey and Langer diverge on many important questions in 
aesthetic theory. These conflicts suggest that there are 
problems in each of their theories which deserve mention 
here. Before examining some of th es e problems briefly, it 
is well to note the positive contributions that Dewey and 
Langer have made to aesthetics. 
i. Dewey 's Chief Contribution 
Insofar as Dewey hai achieved his ai~ in aesthetics, 
i.e., to show hot-'! art is continuous with other modes of ex-
perience, he has succeeded in divesting the word. 11 arti! of its 
esoteric connotations and in restoring it to the public domain 
where it can enrich the life of the community. Instead of 
emphasi zing the distinctions between art and nature, between 
ar t and other modes of experience, or, particularly, betvveen 
ar t and actual experience, Dewey repeatedly argues tha t art 
is experience that is meaningfully organized for getting the 
fullest realization out of life.l 
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In insisting that an aesthetic experience is a con-
tex tual Y.Thole and that it occurs within the context of inter-
actions instituted by organislJl and environment, De-..vey ha s 
r e stored art to what he con siders to be its rightful place 
i n experience. In a broad sense, this was Dewey's or i gi na l 
aim and it is his chief contribution to a esthetics, even 
t hough the congency of his argument may be questioned and 
hi s whole purpose obj ected to . 2 
ii . Langer 's Chief Contribution 
Perhaps the most import ant contribution of L~~g er to 
a esthetics is that she has developed a theory which, vlhile 
holdi~g that th e creation of form is par~nount in art, never-
theless explains how form is significant.3 The symbolic 
1. Rader points out Dewey's contribution in this 
respe ct in, A Modern Book, of Aesthetics, pp . 6-7 . 
2. Cert ainly thos e a estheticians whose t hedries pro -
ceed by elimination of el ements of experience until only a 
distinctly Tlaesthetic" element is left, vmuld object to Dewey's 
ori ginal aim. Bell, Fry, Croce, and Sant ayana, to menti on a 
few, would no doubt object, since for all of them there is a 
sharp division between activity tha t is practical, intellec-
tual, or mor al, and activity that is naesthetic. " For· a sum-
mary of t heir vie\'lS, cf., Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics. 
3. Melvin Rader, Rev. of Langer, nFeeling and Form, n 
Journal of Aest:1eti cs, XII (i••arch, 1954), 396 . 
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function of the created form , or semblance, is t hat it is an 
i nst r um ent for t he concept ion of v-rha t subjective ex peri ence 
i s like . In developing a n interpret ation of form al signifi-
c ance t hat shows it ha s co gnitive and truth value, Lan ger 
has shown t hat th ere is an alter native to the vi e1.v t hat art 
i s mea ningl es s , e . g . , th at it is simply play, or plea sure, 
or escape from life. In sofar, at lea st, a s Lang er ' s t heory 
c an be j~stified, she has cl arified and extended the me aning 
of si gnificant form. 
i i i. Problems in Langer's Po sition 
Lang er has been criticized on the ground that her ex -
planation of art a s a wholly created semblance, or illus i on, 
and concomitant vi ew that e a ch art ex ists in an irreducible 
pri maFf i l lusion, is re ally an oversimplific ation of what art 
really is.l In pa i nting, f or example, everything i s not vis-
ual, for tactile and kinesthetic qualities may enter into 
appr eciation , even though the eye is th e organ primarily 
a ct ive in appreci ation of painting .2 
This criticism, whil e it does point t o v.rhat appears to 
be an oversimplification in Langer's notion of virtua l enti-
ties, may not be entirely jus t ifi ed. Langer does contend that 
the basic abstraction of each art is frame d by, and for, a 
single perc eptual faculty , but she does not me an by this tha t 
1 . Dewey, as pointed out above, p .l30 , criticizes the 
theory o f p erception v.rh ich Langer's expla na tion presupposes. 
2 . Rader, Journal of Aesthet ics, XII, 396 . 
all other perceptual qualities are excluded from, say, vis-
ual response to painting. Rather than being excluded, non-
visual qualities may enter into painting, not independently 
as non-visual qualities, but as transformed into visual 
elements in the virtual space that constitutes the caint-
ing.l Tactile qualities could, for example, enter into a 
painting if they are assimilated and transformed in it so 
that they contribute to its primary illusion of virtual 
s pace. There is a sen se, then, in which Langer can say that 
everything in painting is visual. 
The objection to the isolation of one quality as the 
146 
basis for appreciating and distinguishing the separate arts 
is nevertheless some,<Vhat justified so long as it is not cer-
t a in that all sense qualities are in fact capable of trans-
formation into one primary illusion. 
A second criticism of Langer is that she seems to 
isolate conception as the single aspect of the self which i s 
operative in aesthetic appreciation.2 Even though Langer 
means by conception a logical intuition of formal relatedness, 
she still insists that such intuition is contemplative and 
distanced, a nd that it is not an affective st ate. The central 
1. Langer, Feeling and Form, pp. 150-166. 
2. This criticism is noted by A. Berndtson, in, 
"Semblance, Symbol, and Experience in Langer's Aesthetics," 
Journal of Aesthetics, XIV(January, 1956), 489-502. 
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question raised by this criticism, however, is that it is 
doubtful if the presence of feelings and emotions necessarily 
preclude the act of conceiving. 1 
It is not clear whether or not Langer thinks that 
conception and f eeling are incompatible or could interfere 
vdth each other in aesthetic appreciation. It is clear, 
however, that she does not believe feelings a nd emotions to 
be actually pres~nt in appreciation. For example, in speak-
ing of musical significance, she notes that "the proposition 
t hat music arouses emotions in the listener does not seem, 
off hand, like a fantastic or mythical assertion. n2 She goes 
on to no~ t hat, "factual-minded modern psychologists " have 
conducted experiments for the emotional effects of music, but 
t hat these experiments hav e added little to the n-v.rell-known 
f act that most people connect feelings with music, ••• and 
believe they have the feelings while they are under t he influ-
ence of the music.n3 However, most people think they have 
feelings (and they may indeed have them) because music is an 
expressive formulation about feelings. To confuse musical 
forms (which are symbolical formulations of feeling) with 
actual subjective feelings, is to react to music as if it 
1. Ibid. 
2. Philosophy in a New Key, p. 172. 
3. Ibid., p. 173. 
were a sign that is symptomatic of an actual sta t e of 
af fairs .l Bec ause such confusions do occur, 1'we can use 
music to work off our subjective experiences an d restore 
our personal balance, but this is not its primary function. "2 
The primary function of music, and of all art, is that 
of a present ational symbol:3 
If music has any significance, it is semantic, not 
symptomatic. Its "meaning" is evidently not that 
of a stimulus to evoke emotions, nor that of a sig-
nal to announce them; if it has an emotional co ntent, 
it "has" it in the sam e sense th at language 1'has 1' its 
conceptual content--symbolically. It is not usually 
derived from affects not intended for them; but we 
may s ay • • • that it is about them. Music is not 
the cause or the cure of feelings, but their logica l 
ex pression.4 
For the reason that music, as all art, is a symbolic a l pre-
s entation about wh at a ctual expe r ience is like, wha t i t in-
vit es is not affective experienc e but insi ght, cognition , an d 
contempl ation of what the artist's idea of experience is. 
What Langer means, apparently, is that the feelings in art 
ar e imagined but not a ctually felt . 
Insofa r as Langer does exclude any re spons e to art 
vihich woul d mistake the art symbol f or a sign, and t he r eby 
i nitiate a rea ction to it as if it were an actual entity , she 
may v-rell have unnecessa rily ruled out the pos si bili t y t hat 
1. I bi d ., p. 181. 
2. I bi d ., p . 176. 
3. Cf. above, pp. 2 8~32, for th e f unc t ion of presenta-
tional symbols. 
4. Philosophy i n a New Key, p. 176. 
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feelings in art may, indeed, be felt and conceived. Since 
Langer does not mention the factor of felt empathic projec-
tion of experience in art, it seems that she perhaps has 
overlooked the important .role that affective experience may 
have in aesthetic apprecia tion. 
A third and final criticism, or problem, i n Langer's 
position is that she is not clear as to how a work of art 
can be signif icant of experience if it is appreciated only 
as an appearance. Langer insists that to confuse a work of 
art, which is a presentational symbol, for a sign that stands 
for actual experience, is to confuse an illusion of life with 
reality.l There is indeed reason to consi der the art object 
as an illusion, since a minimum of distance2 must be preserved 
if the appreciator is to respond to the object a s object, and 
not as a stimulus to practic a l action. 
However, it is difficult to understand how art can be 
par excellence a meaningful formulationof experience if, 
during aesthetic appreciation, the aesthetic object is not, 
as it were, temporarily experienced as "real," i.e., if there 
is no emp athic projection of "my 1' experience into the object 
so that during appreciation vrhat is perceived does seem to be 
"real," even though it is not in fact real. Langer, to the 
contrary, seems to deny that there is an empat hic projection 
1 . Ibid . , 197-99. 
2. For the sense in which "distance" is used here, 
cf. below, p. 1 51. 
of experi ence in art: "Feeling s revealed in [art7 are essen-
ti a lly not t he passion .•• of 'suc h- and-such and individu -
al ,' inviting us t o put ourselves in that individual's pl a ce , 
but are pres ent ed directly to our underst anding . nl 
Langer s eems to be s aying that in art the apprec i ator 
understands the f eeling s artistically formulated, but t ha t 
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he does not assoc iate or project hi s own feeling s i nto the 
ob j ect since such pr o j ection would interfere with the dist ance 
essential to underst anding of the feeling s pre sented in the 
ob ject. Although it is t rue that some di st ance seems to be 
re quired for aesthetic appreci ation, it is not c lear t hat 
empathic projection neces sari ly causes the l os s of all dis-
t aD ce. Finally, it is not clear how works of art can be si g -
nificant of life felt and lived, if the a esthetic percipient 
does not i n some sense a ctua lly a ssocia te his 0\vn life with 
t hat f ormul a ted in the work of art, gr anting t hat t he a ssoci-
ation is not compl et e. I ndeed, i t may be precisely the em-
pa t hic appreci ation of the object as "real" that a ccounts f or 
t h e power of a gre a t ar tistic work . 
iv . Problems in Dewey 's Position 
The firs t probl em that may be raised abo ut Dewey's 
aesthetics is th at, in insisting that aest hetic exper i en ce 
~nvolves the full partici pation of the self, so th a t in it 
1. Philosophy i n a New Key, p . 180. 
t he distinction between self and object disappears, 1 Dewey 
appears to have included so much of the self that there is 
no self left to experience the object as object . In short, 
in rejecting the notion of ndistancen as too passive, and at 
t he same time asserting that an experience is a full inte-
gration of self and object, Dewey has perhaps overlooked the 
f act that some distanc e is required if the object is to be 
seen as object. For this reason, full participation of the 
desires, interests, and emotions of the self cannot be pres-
ent in aesthetic experience unless they are s een, i.e., dis -
tanced, as objectified, and not subjectively experienced and 
undergone as trmy" immediate concerns. 
It is possible that De,Hey misunderstands vrhat 1'dis-
tance refers to, for it does not mean a passive, inactive 
experience . As f ormul ated by Edw·ard Bullough, 2 the notion 
o f 11 psychical distanceTt has both a negative and a positive 
me a..'1ing . Negatively, it means that in aesthetic experience 
the immediate practic al concerns and i nt erests of the self 
are inhibited; positively it means that a nev.r experience is 
developed on the basis created by the inhibiting action of 
distance. Bullough goes on to s ay that the most desirable 
condition for both artistic production and aesthetic appre-
ciation is the 1'utrnost decrease of Distance without its 
1. Art as Exp erience, p. 249. 
2. "'Psychical Distance' as a Factor in Art ?...nd an 
Esthetic Principle," in Rader, A Modern Book or Aesthetics, 
pp. 401-428. 
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disappearance." 1 Far from being passive, the creation of 
distance is the basis for a very positive experience in 
which the interests of self are seen as objectified in the 
work of art, and not as "my" i :nmediate interests. It is 
possible, then, that Dewey has misinterpreted dist ance as 
a reference to uere passivity. He says, f or example, that 
!!disinterestedness, detachment, psychical distance, all ex -
press ideas that apply to raw primitive desire and impulse, 
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but that are irrelevant to the matter of experience artisti-
cally organized. ''2 According to Dewey, these terms are nega-
tive names for something very positive, viz., an aesthetic 
experience. Although the term ndistancett may connote some-
thing negative to Dewey, for example the separation of organ-
ism and environment, it does not, in Bullough's formulation 
at least, mean tha t aesthetic experience is negative or 
passive. 
The second problem in Dewey's position suggested here 
has to do with the integration of aesthetic and artistic ex-
perience, which is so central t o his theory. This integra-
tion, which is also termed the integration of undergoing and 
doing, pla ces \l'rh e.t may well be excessive demands on both the 
aesthetic appreciator and the artist. 
On the side of aesthetic undergoing , De-vvey believes 
l. Ibid. , p. 409. 
-.--
2. Art as Exuerience, p . 258. 
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t hat experience cannot be aesthetic unless it is informed 
by a knowledge of the manner in which the aesthetic object 
was produced. 1 Appreciation, if it is aesthetic, occurs 
primarily in response to products of art, and not in response 
to natural objects.2 Hovlever, there does seem to be evidence 
that aesthetic experience occurs 'ivithout knovdedge of the 
i tent ion of the artist, and, as \tvell, in response to objects 
in the natural world. If there is aesthetic experience of 
nature, for which there is evidence in the literature of 
aesthetics,3 then it is Rot entirely true t hat appreciation 
depends on apprehension of an object as t he product of art, 
as well a s t he manner of its production. By insisting on 
t he integration and reciproca l relation of undergoing and 
doing, Dewey has perhaps unwarrantably excluded nature from 
t he realm of art, and also excluded mu9h apprecia tion of art 
which is not in fact informed by a knowledge of the activity 
of which it is the consequence. 
Sensory satisfaction, tasting , for example, is aes-
thetic, according to Dewey, when it is informed by a knowledge 
of the activity of which it is the consequence. Tasting \tvould 
1. Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
2. Ibid., p. 48. 
J. Both T.M. Greene and D.H. Parker, for example, be-
lieve tha t there is creative response to nature which is 
aesthetic. Cf. Greene, The Arts and the Art of Criticism, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), pp. 9-10, and 
Parker, The Principles of Aesthetics, (New York: Appleton-
Century -Crofts, Inc., 1946), pp. 20-21. 
be the consequence of the art of cooking in accordance with 
criteria of excellent cuisine.l To appreciate the taste of 
food aesthetically, then, the appreciator would have to know 
something about these criteria. But, in fact, there may be 
many persons vrith aesthetic tastes for food who yet know 
little or nothing about the art of cooking. It is no doubt 
true that their appreciation would be enriched if they pos-
sessed such knowledg e, but it is questionable if knowledge 
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need be a prerequisite for aesthetic taste, either in tasting 
food or in other aesthetic experience, Indeed, the possibility 
of aesthetic experience would be removed from countless lives 
if a knowledge of the various complexities of artistic crea-
tion were prerequisite to it. This, ironically, is exactly 
\vhat Dewey would not vlish to effect by his aesthetic theory. 
On the side of artistic creation, Dewey also says 
that doing and undergoing are integrated in a single act. 
The artist must aesthetically experience his work-in-progress 
in such a manner that each stage of production is controlled 
by its aesthetic adequacy. This is no doubt true within 
limitations, but does not seem to be what always occurs in 
artistic production. In painting it is perhaps most obvious 
that the v10rk is re-touched and revised, and therein produced) 
in accord with aesthetic perception of it as either suitable 
or not suitable to the artist's purposes. But is this what 
happens in musical compo sition or architecture, for example? 
1. Art as Experience, p. 48. 
How can product ion of the stages in the composition of an 
opera be controlled by aesthetic perception of them, and by 
t his perception a lone? This would require any number of 
performing artists to appear before the compos er and per-
form the work at each stage of its development. 
The practical difficulties in integrating undergoing 
and doing, and in making this integration the controlling 
f a ctor in production, would seem at times, at least, to be 
i nsunnountable • . In this connection, Langer's explanation 
of commanding form, or the ba sic idea of the work, seems to 
have more cog ency than Dewey's argument. 
The third and last problem in Dewey's aesthetics for 
m2ntion here concerns his description of ~ experience. 
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Dewey says th at " the most elabo r a te philosophic or scientific 
i nquiry and the most ambitious industri al or political enter-
pri.se has, vJhen its different ingredients constitute an in-
t egral experience, esthetic quality .nl Because of the 
possibility that almost any human enterprise can have aes-
t h etic quality, and since experi ence that is non-aesthetic 
is not worth having, Dewey urges that the aesthetic qua lity 
of an experience should be conferred on as many areas of 
human enterprise as is possible. If the qualities that go 
to make an experience can be conferred on numerous experi-
ences, and therefore occur not only in response to "art," it 
becomes difficult to distinguish experience that is connected 
l. Ibid., p. 55. 
with works of art from any other experience. For exampl e, 
if industrial labor can have the quality of an experience,l 
is it then an art? Or, is philosophical investigation an 
art insofar as it incorporates the qualities of an experi-
enc e? It is not clear from the broad interpretation that 
Dewey gives to ~ experience, as well as i ts broa d applica-
tion to many different kinds of human activity, hm·r art is 
distinguishable from any other human activity ~ This is per-
haps all the more true because experience without the quality 
of art is not truly experience, i.e., it is non-aesthetic. 
Dewey does say, however, that experience is distinctly 
aesthetic v-1hen it is had for its own sake, which is nv-.rhen 
the factors that determine anything which can be called an 
experience • • • are made manifest for their ovm sake. n2 
Such experience, in which the qualities and characteristics 
of an experience are enjoyed in themselves, is meaningful 
and worthwhile as experience. For this reason, an experi-
ence per se is not aesthetic unless it is had for its own 
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sake. Thus, Dev-.rey does seem to insist on a unique 11 aesthetic'' 
factor in his View of art as experience. However, although 
the formal cha r acteristics of an experience might well be 
applicable to experience apart from art, it is questionable 
1. Dewey insists the common distinction made between 
the "fine" and nuseful" arts is itself a product of an inco-
herent and non-aesthetic social structure, so that the dis-
tinction is artificial and not inherent i n the subject matter 
of either activity. Art as Experience, pp. 116, 176, 260, 262. 
2. Art as Experience, p. 57. 
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if the distinctly aesthetic factor in an experience could be 
conferred on the nurnerous experiences of the community as a 
v1hole. Whether or not it could be is not the is sue here. 
The point of this criticism is, rather, that Dewey is not un-
ambiguous in exactly -vvhat he means by art. If any hum an ex-
perience is mnenable to transformation into an experience, 
then it is difficult to distinguish betvieen art and, for ex-
ample, politics, ethics, or economics. If, however, art is 
limited to experience having the distinctive aesthetic factor 
of intrinsicality, then art is quite distinct frot other 
areas of human enterprise. Since Dewey aimed in aesthetics 
to show the continuity between art and th e rest of hw~an 
experience, it is perhaps correct to say that he views art 
within the context of total human experience, and :1ot as 
sepE!-rated from it by an naesthetic 11 element.l Nevertheless, 
his theory of art does contain evidence to the contrary. 2 
3. Conclusions 
In this chapter the aesthetics of Dewey and 1 2illger 
have been compared ~nd contrasted, and certain problems have 
l . Pepper would apparently interpret Dewey this way, 
vlhen he writes: nit is another characteristic of contextual-
ist point of view not to admit of sharp lines between dif-
ferent spheres of judgment. So one is a t a loss to say of 
Dewey's Art as Experience ••• whether it is mainly a book 
in esthetics or in ethics. It is a crusade against all man-
ner of attitudes and custums and social conditions vJh ich stand 
in the way of our getting the fullest realization of our en-
vironment and our lives. Cf. Stephe·n C. Pepper, "Contextualis-
tic Criticism, TT in Rader, A Iv'Iodern Book of Aesthetics, p. 509. 
2. Art as Experience, pp. 57, Sh-85, 290 . 
been raised in connection with each of their theories. 
In the comparative exposition it was pointed out t hat 
Dewey and Langer approach aesthetics with different views of 
the nature of phi l osophy. Devrey emphasized tha t philosophy 
functions as a criticism of all crit, i ci sms, and as an organ 
fo r th e enrichment of the life of the community. Langer's 
view of philosophy contrasted with Dewey's insofa r as she 
held that philosophy is primarily a study of the logic of 
meanings, comprising all the rational sciences and governed 
by t he principle of seeking logical implic ations. 
In their respective aims in aesthetics Langer and 
Dewey again showed a contrast. Langer aimed to interpret 
art as a form of symbolism, and began her analysis of art 
by an examination of artistic creation and the created work. 
Dewey, on the other hand, proposed to show how art is con-
nected with other modes of experience. For this purpose he 
began his exrunination of art 1Ni th an inquiry into t he nature 
of experience. 
It wa s pointed out that in respect to a esthetic a p-
preciation Langer held that experience is distanced and 
primarily conceptual, v-rhereas Dev1ey insisted that apprecia-
tion involves the full participation of all the psychological 
ela~ents of the self in a controlled experience of undergoing-
doing. 
The views of Dewey and Langer contrasted aga in on t h e 
question of perception in art. Langer developed a vi evr of. 
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primary illusions in which the separate arts were defined 
by the individual perceptual illusions they create. Dewey, 
it was sugg ested, vmuld object to any vievl holding that there 
is ever an isol8ted perception by one sense organ . His ob-
jection to Langer's theory of primary illusions would be that 
pure vision, or hearing,do'e's not exist, since the operation of 
any one perceptual organ involves the energies of the entire 
perceptual apparatus . 
On the subject of expression in art, it wa s suggested 
that Dev1ey and Langer are in substantial agreement t hat 
sheer expression is not art. Dewey holds that sheer expres-
sion is only expulsion of energy, without intelligent direc-
tion, whereas Langer holds that direct expression requires 
no form . 
A contrast of Dewey and Langer on the nature of artis-
tic creation suggested that they hold to ess entially different 
views of the creative process. Dewey maintains that creation 
is the outcome of an experience of undergoing-doing, in which 
aesthetic perception of each phas e of the work-in-progress 
controls th e question of production . Langer, agreeing that 
perception of the work-in-progress is suggestive for further 
creation, nevertheless insists that artistic creation is con-
trolled by an initial idea of the commanding form the work is 
to take. 
In an analysis of the relation of form to experience, 
it vvas found th2.t Dewey believes that form is the moving 
integration of an experience, while Langer, to the contrary, 
argues that form is an abstraction from experience of a par-
ticular configuration of experience. 
It was suggested that Dewey and Langer agree that art 
has meaning which is non-propositional and peculiar to art. 
Dm,rey, however, locates artistic meaning in .§....!! experience of 
art , whereas Langer locates it in the logical underst anding 
of the vital import of a work of art, i.e., that it reveals 
to conception the patterns of human sentience. 
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Dewey and Langer were found to b e in agreement that 
the organic form in art is wh at gives it the impression of 
life, or quality of livingness. It was also pointed out that 
they both believe that the organic form in art is an objec-
tification of organic life processes. 
Dewey and Langer v1ere found to be in agreement, in the 
final analysis, that artistic form is intuj_ted or not seen at 
all . They both hold that such intuition is ineffable. 
In the final area of comparison, it was suggested that 
in regard to the relation of art to society, Dewey and Langer 
both contend that art is essential to the healthy life of the 
community. Langer argues that art provide s for the fulfill-
ment of man's basic need, i.e., to symbolize reality and 
thereby understand it; Dewey was found to place a different 
emphasis on the importance of art, since he maintained that 
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art is exp erience th a t is an intelligent and meaningful organ-
ization of life. 
In the critical section of this chapter, three problems 
were raised in connection with each author's theory. The 
f irst problem discussed in Langer' s theory wa s that her theory 
of pri mary illusions may be an oversimplification of art. 
Secondly, it was questioned whether or not Lang er has unneces-
sarily ruled out the possibility that f eelings may be actually 
undergone in aesthet ic experience and conceived at the same 
time . The third pro blern raised about Langer's theory was that 
it is not clear how art is s i gnifican t of t he life of f eeling 
if the feelings in art are never actually felt as objectified, 
i.e., if there is no empathic projection of the apprecia tor' s 
experience into the object. 
The first problem raised about Dewey's aesthetics dis-
cussed whether or not he may have rejected the idea of "dis-
tance" as too passive, vvi t hout underst anding that i t does not 
connote passivity per se, nor the separation of the organism 
from environment. The second pro blem in Dewey was t h e exces-
sive demands he may well place upon the appreciator and the 
artist by insi sting that Q~dergoing and doing ar e reciprocally 
rela ted in aesthetic experience and artisti c pro duction. Fi -
nally, it was questioned whether or not De1•rey ha s characterized 
art so that it is distinguishable from other areas of human 
experience. In this connection, it did not seem to be clea r 
V'rhether art is characterized by Devvey a s an experience, or 
whether it is limit ed to an aesthetic experience having a 
unique a esthetic ingredient. 
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ABS'rRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare and contrast 
the aesthetics of John Dewey and Susanne K. Langer. The first 
chapter comprises the introduction, in 111[hich the specific pur-
poses, methods, limitations, and definitions of the thesis are 
presented. 
The second chapter is an examination of Langer's aes-
thetics. After defining philosophy as a study of meanings 
governed by the principle of s eeking logical implic ations, 
Langer goes on to state her aims in aesthetics, 1vhich are; 
to interpret art as a form of symbolism, and to clarify the 
meanings of many terms frequently used in aesthetics. She 
contends that the origins of symbolism may be traced to man's 
tendency to symbolize reality, which is also his uni que basic 
need. Presentational symbolism, which is the symbolic form 
of art, is the direct presentation of an object, and invites 
conceptual response, not overt practical behavior. The art 
object is an expressive .form 1-vhich is a semblable pres entation 
and formulation of the artist's idea of what the nature of 
subjective experience is like. The artist does not directly 
self-express his emotions and feelings in the creative pro-
cess, since direct self-expression requires no form. Art, 
Langer holds, reveals the life of feeling in a way that 
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discourse cannot. This is because artistic forms are con-
sonant with the forms of f eeling , \vhereas discursive forms 
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are not. Significant form in art has significance, or 11 v ital 
import," because it presents a logical pattern congruent with 
the logic of the forms of sentience. The basic response of 
the aesthetic appreciator is to conceive the idea of emotion 
that is formulated and objectified in the aesthetic object. 
This conception is intuitive, not discursive, for the reason 
that it is a direct grasp of formal si gnificance. The intui-
tion of formal significance is logical as well, since it is 
a simple awareness of congruence and relatedness between the 
forms in art and the forms of subjective life. The truth of 
a v.1ork of art is the degree in which it is "true to 11 the 
fonns of feeling. Art has an essential social import insofar 
as it serves to fulfill man's basic need to symbolize experi-
ence, therein making it conceivable and capable of under-
standing. Man's healthy orientation in society and nature 
depends on his ability to make the world understandable , \vhich 
accounts for the social function of art . 
Chapter th.ree is an examination of John Dev.Jey' s aes-
thetic theory. Dev-rey defines philosophy as a "criticism of 
criticisms," which employs experimental method and has as its 
subject matter the naturally g enerated goods of experience. 
Philosophy has the si gnificant social function of clarifying 
the meanings of social and moral conflicts, 1pJith an aim to 
liberate, expand, and r econstruct social values. Dewey 
states that his purpose in aesthetics is to show how art 
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is continuous vri t h othe r modes of experience. With this 
purpose in mind, Dewey begi n s in aesthetics wit h an analysis 
of the a esthetic elements in normal exper i ence, whi ch c.re 
products of the intera ction of or gani sm and environment. The 
a esthetic elements i n normal expe rience, i . e., balance, har-
mony, equilibrium, nd rhythm, become dominant in what Dev-1ey 
terms ~ expe rience . In ~ experience these char a cteri stics 
of experi enc e a re man ifested for the ir ovm sake , and consti-
tute the contextual unity and dyn amic movement of organically 
related parts which is an experience. The aesthetic response 
is char acterized as including both surrender, which involves 
the undergoing of t he object, an d hei ghtened activity, which 
denotes the active (doing ) re-cre ation of the object. Aes-
thet ic appreci ation requires both undergoing and do ing , and 
i s controlled by their reciprocal relation in ae sthetic ex-
. pe rience . Dewey insists that appreci ation is aesthetic v-1hen 
it is informed by a knovrledge of the productive activity 
(artistic production) of which it is the consequence . Emo-
t ions enter into appreciation, not as indep endent "1things, n 
but as qualified and controlled by the inf luence of p st ex-
perience and by the expe riential context in wh ich they adhere 
to an expressive object. In addition to emotion, all the 
psychological elements of the s elf fully participate in the 
controlled experienti al context of an integral experienc e of 
the art object. In artistic production emotive expression is 
also controlled within the context of ~ experienc e , and by 
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the previous experience of the artist, as well as by t he in-
telligent use of media for its. expressive objecti f ication . 
Dew·ey points out that the artist is engag ed in the overt mak-
ing of an object, but that he must a l so aesthetically perceive 
his work at each step, so that what is made can be related to 
its perceptual adequacy and to what is to follow. Thus, doing 
and undergoing are reciprocally related in the artistic pro-
duction, for Dewey insists that making is artistic \'Then its 
perceived result has controlled the manner of production. 
Form in art is the operation of energies that bring an ex-
perience to fulfillment. The primary energy affecting this 
end is rhythmic development, vlhich includes the formal charac-
teristics of c~~ulation, conservation, continuity, a nd antici -
pation . Dewey urges that art is import ant f or social processes 
for the reason that it shows how the divisions in experience 
and in society can be resolved . Dewey holds that social ex-
perience, in the degree to which it is experience, ought to 
have the aesthetic quality of an experience. 
Chapter four, the f i nal chapter of thi s thesis, presents 
a comparison and contra st, and a brief evaluation, of the aes-
thetics of Dewey a nd Langer. The views of De1cvey and Langer, 
it is sug gested, diverge and contrast on at least t hese six 
issues: the nature of philosophy, the purpose of aesthetics, 
the characterization of appreciation, the nature of percep-
tion, creation, and form in art. On the other hand, their 
viev:s of expression, meaning, organic form, intuition, and 
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of the relation of art to society seem to be in agreement, 
although their reasoning on these subjects is often very dif-
ferent. The evaluative section of this chapter consists of a 
formulation of three problems that may well be raised in con-
nection with each author' s theory. In regard to Langer's 
position, it is suggested that her theory of pri mary illu-
sions may oversimplify the nature of aesthetic appreciation; 
that she has not given sufficient reason for excluding actual 
feelings from art; and, that it is not clear hovv art can be 
significant of felt-life if there is not, at least, an empathic 
projection of feelings in the aesthetic response. In connec-
tion vvith Dewey's position it is suggested that he has perhaps 
unnecessarily excluded the notion of "distance" as too pas-
sive, v.rhereas it does not meaD passivity alone; that the de-
mands placed on artist and appreciator by the reciproc a l 
relations of undergoing and doing may well be excessive; and , 
that it is not clear hov-1 art is distinguishable from other areas 
of experience if the experience that is art c an be conferred 
on the experience of the community as a whole. 
